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Abstract
While assessing security on single devices can be performed using vulnerability assessment
tools, modelling of more intricate attacks, which incorporate multiple steps on different
machines, requires more advanced techniques. Attack graphs are a promising technique,
however they face a number of challenges.
An attack graph is an abstract description of what attacks are possible against a specific
network. Nodes in an attack graph represent the state of a network at a point in time while
arcs between nodes indicate the transformation of a network from one state to another, via
the exploit of a vulnerability. Using attack graphs allows system and network configuration
information to be correlated and analysed to indicate imminent threats. This approach is
limited by several serious issues including the state-space explosion, due to the exponential
nature of the problem, and the difficulty in visualising an exhaustive graph of all potential
attacks. Furthermore, the lack of availability of information regarding exploits, in a stan-
dardised format, makes it difficult to model atomic attacks in terms of exploit requirements
and effects.
This thesis has as its objective to address these issues and to present a proof of concept so-
lution. It describes a proof of concept implementation of an automated attack graph based
tool, to assist in evaluation of network security, assessing whether a sequence of actions
could lead to an attacker gaining access to critical network resources. Key objectives are
the investigation of attacks that can be modelled, discovery of attack paths, development of
techniques to strengthen networks based on attack paths, and testing scalability for larger
networks. The proof of concept framework, Network Vulnerability Analyser (NVA), sources
vulnerability information from National Vulnerability Database (NVD), a comprehensive,
publicly available vulnerability database, transforming it into atomic exploit actions. NVA
combines these with a topological network model, using an automated planner to identify
potential attacks on network devices. Automated planning is an area of Artificial Intelli-
gence (AI) which focuses on the computational deliberation process of action sequences, by
measuring their expected outcomes and this technique is applied to support discovery of a
best possible solution to an attack graph that is created. Through the use of heuristics de-
veloped for this study, unpromising regions of an attack graph are avoided. Effectively, this
prevents the state-space explosion problem associated with modelling large scale networks,
only enumerating critical paths rather than an exhaustive graph. SGPlan5 was selected
as the most suitable automated planner for this study and was integrated into the system,
employing network and exploit models to construct critical attack paths. A critical attack
path indicates the most likely attack vector to be used in compromising a targeted device.
Critical attack paths are identified by SGPlan5 by using a heuristic to search through the
state-space the attack which yields the highest aggregated severity score. CVSS severity
scores were selected as a means of guiding state-space exploration since they are currently
the only publicly available metric which can measure the impact of an exploited vulnerabil-
ity. Two analysis techniques have been implemented to further support the user in making
an informed decision as to how to prevent identified attacks.
Evaluation of NVA was broken down into a demonstration of its effectiveness in two case
studies, and analysis of its scalability potential. Results demonstrate that NVA can suc-
cessfully enumerate the expected critical attack paths and also this information to establish
a solution to identified attacks. Additionally, performance and scalability testing illustrate
NVA’s success in application to realistically sized larger networks.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In this chapter we introduce the context and motivation for the investigation into use of
attack graphs for enhanced security. It also serves to provide a problem statement, highlight
objectives and outline the structure of this thesis.
1.1 Motivation
Security has become a necessity in today’s world, with people becoming more aware of its
importance as malicious viruses, attempted intrusions and attacks become a frequent oc-
currence. Government and industry rely heavily on information technology, making them
vulnerable targets to hackers and viruses. The repercussions of a well-orchestrated attack
can be devastating to governments or enterprises and their clients. Moreover, sophisticated
attacks on industrial systems can have crippling effects on cities.
One of the most pernicious types of attack is where the execution of a virus ’pivots’ from
machine to machine. In this context, pivoting refers to a shift in an attacker’s position by
relocating to a compromised machine. A compromised machine can acts as a new source of
attack on other machines in a network. A virus known as Downadup or Conficker has been
one of the most prolific viruses in the last few years, infecting a large number of computers
worldwide. According to security provider F-Secure, an estimated 9 million computers were
1
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infected in the period of June to December 2009.1 Downadup spreads by exploiting a remote
code execution vulnerability on many unpatched versions of Microsoft Windows. It has the
ability to scan a network for vulnerable hosts as well as copy itself to removable drives. While
Downadup remains on a removable drive it attempts to infect other computers when the is
drive inserted, leveraging the autorun function, which is enabled on Microsoft Windows by
default.2 The effects of such an aggressive virus can be crippling for organizations because it
can rapidly spread throughout its entire infrastructure. Consequently, there is a requirement
for more advanced techniques in network protection.
Red October, a disturbing attack discovered in January 2013, targeted governmental orga-
nizations. Confidential documents regarding nuclear research, oil companies, geopolitical
intelligence and computer access credentials were stolen in this attack. Moreover, Red Oc-
tober’s code had the ability to undelete and steal files from removal disks plugged into any
infected computers.3 The malware was found to spread to prospective victims via e-mail,
containing a Microsoft Word or Excel document attachment which contains the malicious
payload. In addition to the aforementioned attack vector, it was also discovered that attack-
ers infiltrated victim networks via a Java exploit known as Rhino. By e-mailing a link to a
malicious site to victims, a Java payload is injected into victims with outdated versions of
Java.4
Attacks typically do not involve just one machine, but rather target a number of systems,
which may be through firewalls and several layers of security. These types of attacks are
known as advanced persistent threats (APT). They are complex multi-step attacks, which
involve the exploitation of a number of vulnerabilities on different machines. By installing
backdoors on machines across a network, it allows an attacker to maintain access without
discovery.5 The overall result of such an attack allows an attacker to reach a specific goal,
while circumventing security measures.
For example, we consider an example of an attack on an organization’s customer database.
In the wrong hands, this kind of information could have massively detrimental effects on
1http://www.f-secure.com/weblog/archives/00001584.html
2http://www.symantec.com/security response/writeup.jsp?docid=2008-112203-2408-99
3http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-21013087
4https://www.securelist.com/en/analysis/204792265/Red October Detailed Malware Description 1 First Stage of Attack#1
5http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/definition/advanced-persistent-threat-APT
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the organization. An instance of this occurred in 2011, where hackers compromised Sony
PlayStation’s user database, costing Sony more than $170 million and took the service of-
fline for two weeks.6 In Figure 1.1, the topology of an example organization’s network is
illustrated, revealing how an attacker can interact with it.
Figure 1.1: An attacker can compromise a network by pivoting from machine to machine
until he reaches his target.
The network features a single firewall, web server, file server and a customer database. The
public only has access to the organization’s website, hosted on the web server. While the
attacker’s goal is to retrieve client information from the customer database, he does not
have direct access to it due to restricted ingress connections by the firewall. So how could
an attacker manipulate his current access to further gain access to his target? By exploit-
ing a vulnerability in the organization’s web server, the attacker pivots his position to the
web server, gaining vision of the internal network topology and insight into other oppor-
tunities. Next, scanning the internal network, he finds that he now has direct access to
the customer database and the file server. Reconnaissance on these machines also reveals
that the file server has an exploitable vulnerability, and that the database server in fact
has two exploitable vulnerabilities. The first database vulnerability is remotely exploitable
and provides the attacker with user level privileges, while the second vulnerability is locally
exploitable and yields administrator privileges. By exploiting these two vulnerabilities se-
quentially, the attacker not only gains access to the database server but also has the highest
6http://smallbusiness.chron.com/effects-computer-hacking-organization-17975.html
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system privilege level. The result of this is that he can steal customer information from
the database as well as place a backdoor on the system to maintain his access to it. It is
important to note that the path of attack that the attacker chose was not the only path of
attack, considering that he could have also opted to compromise the database server via the
file server. At each step of an attack, the attacker can make a variety of decisions, each of
which may or may not lead to the attacker achieving his goal.
Attack graphs provide a description of attacks by linking atomic attack steps to form a
complex multi-step attack, similar to the situation described above. They illustrate each of
the potential decisions an attacker can make at each step of an attack, based on information
about the systems under attack. Nodes represent the configuration or state of a network at a
point in time, while arcs between nodes represent exploits which have an effect on machines
in a network, effectively transitioning it to a new state. Figure 1.2 shows an attack graph
based on Figure 1.1, exhaustively enumerating each possible attack that an externally based
attacker can perform on the network. Two pieces of information are required to construct
attack graphs: information about a network and vulnerability information. Using this infor-
mation, an attack graph can be constructed which enumerates every possible attack action.
The advantage of this is that it condenses a large amount of security information into a visu-
alization, which is far more comprehendable for security administrators. Moreover, analysis
of attack graphs can offer insight into weak or reachable points in a network, making it
simpler to identify the best points in a network to secure, given that it is not always feasible
to patch every vulnerable host. With such large volumes of security information it would
be highly beneficial to have automated tools which can compute security metrics and find
potential security weaknesses.
In large enterprise networks, a vast number of events are generated by devices every second.
Analysis of event data can potentially prevent malicious users from gaining access to systems
in the network, however the overwhelming amount of data makes manual analysis highly im-
practical. Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) systems were developed for
this sole task, aggregating event data from network devices and correlating it to help discover
suspicious host activity. By responding to alerts in real-time, a security administrator can
take appropriate countermeasures to impede an attack in progress. During a SIEM life-cycle
multiple risk assessment phases are performed, to gauge the overall security level of network
infrastructure and determine its weakness against attack. One must consider the implica-
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Figure 1.2: An attack graph showing each step involved in a complex multi-step attack.
The attacker pivots from machine to machine to reach his final goal.
tions of updating network infrastructure, via the addition or removal of devices. Updating
network infrastructure may result in the introduction of new vulnerabilities and in turn, new
opportunities for an attacker to take advantage of. For this reason it is crucial to perform
risk assessments on a regular basis, especially after the modification of network infrastruc-
ture. This thesis considers an approach whereby SIEM could be augmented with automated
attack modelling, to enhance threat modelling capabilities with rich network configuration
details.
1.2 Problem Statement
While attack graph construction is not a new concept, its use has been largely restricted in
real-life applications due to certain computational limitations. Previous research on attack
graph construction, elaborated on in Section 2.2.2, focused on generating exhaustive attack
graphs, which enumerate every possible outcome of an attack action at each stage of attack.
Exhaustive searches of attack graphs become exceedingly difficult to manage as networks
grow in complexity. This issue is commonly known as the combinatorial problem, and oc-
curs in many applied mathematics and theoretical computer science optimization problems.
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Visually, it also becomes challenging to illustrate such large attack graphs, which is coun-
terproductive considering that they are meant to be simple and understandable for security
administrators.
1.3 Research Objectives
Taking into account the aforementioned problem statement, the following objectives will be
addressed. The research investigation aims are:
• Investigation of the type of attacks that can be modelled effectively using an attack
planning approach. Attack data will be sourced from publicly available vulnerability
databases. The types of information available from these databases and the structure
of entries will play a deciding factor in this aim.
• Discovery of whether critical paths can be enumerated, which lead to the compromise
of vulnerable network resources. A proof of concept framework will be designed, imple-
mented and tested against networks where expected critical paths have already been
calculated.
• Identification of how a vulnerable network’s security can best be strengthened, based
on projected models. Investigation into attack graph analysis techniques will establish
approaches most suitable for application to network security planning problems.
• Demonstration of how well the proposed solution can scale for large networks. By
generating and evaluating networks of increasing complexity and size, success will
be determined by the framework’s ability to consistently discover solutions without
crashing due resource depletion.
1.4 Structure of this Thesis
Chapter 1 serves to introduce this thesis and outline some of its key focuses. The motivation
for this thesis was noted and followed by the problem statement. Based on these two sections,
the research objectives of this work are listed and elaborated on.
Chapter 2 presents a background and related works which have influenced decisions made
in this thesis. It first overviews SIEM and highlights its role in enhancing network security.
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Then it discusses various attack graph approaches, outlining their benefits and shortcomings.
Lastly, it looks at various automated planning models and describes several state-space
searching algorithms.
Chapter 3 proposes a design for a proof of concept framework and details the system
architecture. The chapter is broken down into three phases: Information Aggregation, Attack
Graph Computation and Visualization.
Chapter 4 provides a description of the implementation of the proof of concept framework
and includes the inner workings of the most important procedures. These include network
generation, vulnerability extraction, network configuration extraction, model transformation
and analysis.
Chapter 5 subjects the implementation to evaluation, using two different testing techniques.
The first evaluates its effectiveness in identifying critical attack paths in two case studies.
Furthermore, it guides the user through its usage with a walkthrough that demonstrates
basic functionality. The second evaluation techniques gauges the framework’s performance
and scalability against increasingly large and complex generated networks.
Chapter 6 concludes this thesis, briefly revisiting and summarizing some of the key topics
covered. It examines the effectiveness of this thesis, by comparing the evaluation results with
the initial research objectives. Then it reveals opportunities which could be incorporated
into future works on this topic.
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Background
In this chapter we review various topics pertaining to network security and attack graph
construction. The concept of Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) is in-
troduced, revealing its relevance in attack graph construction and how it can be enhanced.
Furthermore, various attack graph construction techniques are reviewed, discussing some of
the benefits and shortcomings of each. Lastly, we provide an overview of the automated
planning field and how this approach can benefit attack graph construction.
2.1 Security Information and Event Management
2.1.1 Overview
In modern computer networks large amounts of security log data are generated from a va-
riety of hardware devices and software applications by the second. These logs files include
all sorts of information, ranging from events triggered by systems and devices to user activ-
ities within a network infrastructure. An organization’s security status can be investigated
by performing forensic operations on captured log data, revealing potential flaws or attacks
against its network. Analysis of log files offers a wide variety of information, such as user
level information (authentication, file access or internet activity), system and device level
data (file read, write or delete, network traffic information and session status) and network
security activities (identifying virus or attack signatures)[1].
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A means of centralised log management and analysis on these vast amounts of data is offered
by Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) systems. The concept of SIEM sys-
tems can be attributed to Gartner analysts Amrit Williams and Mark Nicolett[2] and is a
combination of two disparate but complementary technologies, namely Security Information
Management (SIM) and Security Event Management (SEM). The amalgamation of these
two technologies offers several useful services to security administrators in charge of keeping
a network secure, as is illustrated in Figure 2.1.
SIM is primarily concerned with a historical analysis of the network system and application
logs, and is generally used for internal network threat management as well as regulatory com-
pliance auditing. Several critical functions of SIM solutions include log storage and archival,
data analysis and reporting[3].
Conversely, the SEM solution is focused on the real-time aspects of network security, provid-
ing monitoring and event correlation and processing. The events being analysed are alerts
generated from devices such as firewalls, Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) that react to
suspicious host activity, based on several pre-constructed patterns[3].
2.1.2 Typical SIEM Roles
SIEMs aim to provide event archiving, reporting, real-time analysis and alert generation
using events generated from various devices and applications within a network, aiding or-
ganizations in responding to attacks and managing data[4]. Log data is collected and ag-
gregated from various sources, such as desktop computers, servers, routers, application and
Syslog devices. This is achieved using edge-side agents installed on devices, filtering out
inconsequential data and normalizing it into formats which can later be fed into core-side
correlation engines for analysis[5]. At the most basic level, SIEMs often offer rule-based or
statistical correlation engines to identify any relationships between events. Correlation of
event data may offer insight into attacks against the network, producing crucial alerts so
that administrators can take suitable countermeasures.
Although the term “SIEM” was only coined relatively recently (2005), the market has ma-
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Figure 2.1: A collection of functions offered by SIM and SEM, which are included in
the operations of a SIEM system[1].
tured and has become competitive quite rapidly, Multiple vendors now offering products
featuring typical SIEM requirements[6]. Three primary use cases form the core of a typical
SIEM’s characteristics, these include the following:
• Management of log files and compliance reporting
• Real-time monitoring of user and application activity, data access and incident man-
agement
• A framework which offers administrators an array of suitable threat management op-
tions, such as policy countermeasure enforcement or decision support
2.1.3 Generic SIEM Architecture
The architecture of a SIEM is layered and consists a data collection layer, data integration
layer and an analysis layer, as shown in Figure 2.2. The data collection layer is responsible
for aggregation of log data that is stored in a repository, and made available to applica-
tions that handle analysis and interpretation. After the log data has been collected, the
data integration layer manages data description and transport to locations required to do
further processing. Finally, the analysis layer provides functionality for performing various
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data analysis operations. The separation of these three layers removes the need for data
collection, processing and integration for each analysis engine. This makes the development
and integration of third party plugins and analysis engines much easier, by decoupling log
data collection and normalization from analysis. Third party plugins can use pre-collected
and normalized log data rather than repeating this process, which can be computationally
expensive.
Figure 2.2: A depiction of the general struction of a SIEM’s architecture, including the
various layers required for its operation[7].
2.1.4 Further Development Opportunities
Although SIEMs have matured to a certain extent, many chief information security officers
feel that SIEMs are failing to offer more sophisticated capabilities they would like to add[8].
Organizations face an increasing number of threats on a daily basis and malefactors are
becoming more sophisticated in their attack strategies, resulting in increased difficulty in
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threat detection. This issue prompts the advancement of SIEM technology and the devel-
opment of of new approaches to aid in identifying threats posed against a network. One
such approach is the generation and analysis of threat attack graphs, which can be used in
SIEMs. Integration of the proof of concept framework in this research with SIEM is not
within the scope of this thesis, however there is the potential for integration in future work.
2.2 Analysis of Network Security Using Attack Graphs
2.2.1 Overview
Attack graphs offer a graph-based approach to analysing network vulnerabilities, by showing
how individual attacks can be composed to create larger attack paths. They symbolise a col-
lection of potential scenarios whereby a malicious user attacks a network. Such capabilities
can answer questions such as “Can an external malefactor find a path that will allow him
to read sensitive corporate information?” or “If a network is under attack, what should we
fix first?” These answers allow a network administrator to prioritize changes that need to
made to the network in order to secure it. A scenario is represented by a sequence of attack
steps by a malefactor, often resulting in a particular goal, such as gaining administrative
access to a host device, access to a database or the disruption of service offered. The flexible
nature of this technique allows for the analysis of attacks originating from within the network
or externally, examining the risks posed against a particular device or the network as a whole.
An attack graph consists of nodes, each of which represent the state of a network as a whole,
during the execution of an attack by a malefactor on one of the devices within the network.
Edges connecting nodes symbolise state transitions of a network, corresponding with an
atomic action executed by a malefactor. Numerous different types of approaches to attack
graphs and trees have been developed, including a variety security analysis techniques.
2.2.2 Related Work
R. Ortalo et al.[9] consider an approach whereby attack graphs are generated using topolog-
ical vulnerability analysis techniques, in order to enumerate possible sequences of exploits.
Vulnerabilities in computer systems are represented using privilege graphs. These privilege
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graphs contain nodes symbolising sets of privileges owned by users or sets of users, while
edges represent vulnerabilities. An edge is drawn from a node X to a node Y should there
be some method granting a user owning X privileges to obtain those of node Y. The system
proposed assigned weights to edges corresponding to the effort required for an attacker to
exploit a particular vulnerability. At the time, such detailed intrusion data was not available,
prompting the usage of general parameters obtained from security experts. However, today
this data is available using security metric data stored in the Common Vulnerability Scoring
System (CVSS)[10] format, from the National Vulnerability Database (NVD)1.
L. Swiler et al.[12] implemented a tool which constructs attack graphs by matching infor-
mation for attack requirements to network configuration information. Attack paths with
the highest probability of success can be identified by assigning weights to edges, based on
estimates of the time to succeed in exploiting a vulnerability and the amount of effort to do
so. The Naor and Brutlag’s algorithm is used to computer ε-optimal paths and the number
of ε-optimal paths an edge participates in. Nodes and edges of the attack graph occurring
most frequently in the set of ε-optimal paths are defined as critical paths or paths with
the highest probability of success. This technique thus far has only been suitable for smaller
networks and only generates graphs forward from an initial node, rather than backward from
a goal node.
R. Ritchey and P. Ammann[13] proposed the usage of a model checker to perform network
vulnerability analysis. Vulnerabilities are encoded into a state machine description suitable
to be processed by a model checker. The authors asserted that an attacker cannot acquire a
certain privilege level on a particular host. The model checker is then able to either assure
the correctness of this assertion or provide a counterexample with the detail of each level of
attack.
O. Sheyner et al.[14] use algorithms which generate attack graphs based on a symbolic model
checking approach. The algorithm attempts to produce a counterexample to demonstrate an
attacker’s path. An analysis technique called Minimization Analysis looks at identifying the
most cost-effective method for a network administrator to prevent an attack from occurring.
1NVD is a repository of vulnerability management data, including security checklists, security related
software flaws, misconfigurations, product names and impact metrics[11].
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The essence of this analysis algorithm looks at determining a minimal set of atomic attack
actions which must be prevented to guarantee that an intruder cannot reach his goal.
R. Rieke[15] provides a tool for vulnerability assessment, which computes attack paths and
verifies certain security properties. Elements modelled include computer networks, vulnera-
bilities, exploits and attacker strategies, in order to automatically compute all possible attack
paths. Future research objectives suggest the investigation of techniques to manage the state
space explosion issue 2, by refining concepts of abstraction of system specifications.
R. Lippmann and K. Ingols[16] developed a tool called NetSPA, which is able to automati-
cally construct and analyse attack graphs, aiming to discover firewall configuration defects
and critical host vulnerabilities. Attack graphs require large amounts of source information,
such as network configurations, host product information and vulnerability information.
NetSPA receives most of its data by importing it from common sources, including vulnera-
bility scanners, firewalls and online vulnerability databases.
I. Kotenko and A. Chechulin[17] designed a tool named AMSEC, which models attacks and
evaluates security metrics for SIEM systems. AMSEC features an internal security repos-
itory and uses open security databases such as NVD to source vulnerability data. Attack
trees are generated by incorporating information about service dependencies, zero-day vul-
nerabilities, predictions of possible attack actions, security metrics, and attack and response
impacts. The tool functions in two modes, called design mode and exploitation mode. De-
sign mode produces a set of attack trees based on network configuration information an
security policies. Exploitation mode adjusts attack trees generated during the design mode
and re-generates attack trees, by taking into account predicted attacker capabilities, to pro-
duce countermeasures. AMSEC addresses the state-space explosion problem by combining
the use of attack graphs with service dependency graphs. The former provides insight into
the evolution of an attack on a network, while the latter can track the impact of an attack
as it advances. Moreover, the set of actions that an attacker can perform are determined
by attacker models, which define an attacker’s skill level. This limits the amount of exploit
actions that can be performed at each step of attack, helping to prevent state-space explosion.
2A serious problem in model checking practices is the state space explosion issue. The number of states
in a model grows exponentially according to the number of program variables in it. Exploration of the entire
state space can become impractical when there are a vast number of states.
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C. Sarraute et al.[18] consider an approach which targets real world scenarios. Attack models
are represented in the Planning Domain Definition Language (PDDL)[19] language 3, allow
the problem to be approached using a planner. The planner is integrated into a penetration
testing suite, allowing for automated generation of attack paths for penetration testing sce-
narios and furthermore providing validation of attacks by executing corresponding exploits
against actual target networks. The state space explosion problem caused by scalability
issues is associated with most attack graphing techniques mentioned above, since they make
use of model checking approaches. It has been noted that a major limitation of previous
studies is that most attack graph algorithms have only been able to generate attack graphs
on small networks with fewer than 20 hosts. Building a complete attack graph of medium
or large-sized networks proves to be infeasible.
2.3 Automated Planning
2.3.1 Overview
Automated Planning is an area of Artificial Intelligence (AI) which focuses on the computa-
tional deliberation process of action sequences by measuring their expected outcomes. This
deliberation process attempts to discover a best possible solution with respect to a stated
goal, often requiring optimization in multidimensional space. A motivation for automated
planning, in a more practical sense, comes with the consideration of designing information
processing tools which provide resource planning.
2.3.2 Fields of Planning Application
Since planning domains consist of various types of actions, a number of fields or forms of
planning applications exist. Some of the most common of these fields include path and
motion planning, perception planning and information gathering, navigation planning and
3PDDL was developed as a standardized language used in benchmarking Artificial Intelligence planners.
The common formalism allows planners to be compared, while attempting to solve planning problems.
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manipulation planning[20, p. 3].
Path and motion planning relates to the design an construction of a path from an initial
point to a goal point, taking into account the configurations of the system responsible for
locomotion and its environment; for example, a vehicle or robotic arm.
Perception planning involves plans concerned with sensing actions. In scenarios requiring
information gathering from numerous sources, it can aide the system in deciding where to
look for it, which sensors are required to do so and how to use them. This field of planning
is prevalent in robotics, where a controller may be responsible for obtaining states related
with an environment or actions for motion control and planning[21].
Navigation planning is a combination of both motion and perception planning, used in reach-
ing targeted spatial goals or area exploration. This technique aids robots in localizing them-
selves within an environment, mapping areas and generation or waypoints within these areas.
Manipulation planning deals with the handling or manipulation of objects, taking into con-
sideration information which can be translated into mechanical actions. This information
includes forces, touch, vision, auditory and other sensory information. Plans of this nature
can be utilized in scenarios such as a production line in a factory, where robotic arms may
be responsible for picking up objects and inserting them into assemblies for example.
2.3.3 Conceptual Planning Model
A plan can be described as a structure which aims to achieve certain objectives by using
certain appropriate actions[20, p. 7]. It is an enumeration of a path through a state-transition
graph, describing an ordered sequential list of actions to be performed. These objectives can
be defined in several ways, each of which offer benefits suited to solving problems of specific
domain types. Ways in which objectives can be described are listed as follows:
• An objective can be defined as a goal state or set of goal states, which are valid for
any sequence of state transitions ending in one of the goal states
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• A sequence of state transitions can be forced to adhere to certain conditions in order
to achieve goal states
• Utility functions can provide conditions to state sequences, such as penalties or rewards.
A goal may aim to satisfy various conditions required, while attempting to optimize
these utility functions over the sequence of valid states
• Further tasks to be performed can be listed as objectives, providing a defined set of
actions to complete
A state-transition system describes all possible evolutionary outcomes of a system. It can be
described using the 4-tuple Σ = (S, A, E, γ), where S is a finite set of states {s1, s2,..., sk},
A is a finite set of actions {a1, a2,..., ak} and E is a finite set of events {e1, e2,..., ek}, ∀ k
∈ N. The last symbol of the 4-tuple is γ, a state-transition function with S×(A
⋃
E )→2S.
An action a ∈ A is valid in s if γ(s, a) 6= ∅. For all valid a ∈ A, the system transitions from
state s to s′, using s′ = γ(s, a)[22].
The planning model, component interaction and plan execution flow can be visualized using
Figure 2.3. The planner component is fed the description of the state-transition system Σ,
an initial state s0 and a set of objectives or goals Sg. It is responsible for the generation of
a plan, according to its input. The controller receives a plan from the planner as well as
a current state s from the state-transition system, from an observation function, as input.
There exists an observation function, which contains partial knowledge of the current state,
η(s) such that η: S→O, where O = {o1, o2,...}, which provides an observation o to the
controller. The controller yields an action a, which is dispatched to the state-transition
system. Finally, the state-transition system evolves the system, using the state-transition
function γ, based on event input and actions received from the controller component[20, p.
8].
The concept of states and state-transitions can be illustrated by the domain of a dock worker
crane and transport robot, shown in Figure 2.4. This example is very simple and provides a
very clear demonstration of how actions on objects in a domain result in disparate states. In
this domain, the crane is capable of performing actions such as moving putting a container
down(put), taking a container(take), loading a container onto the transport robot(load) or
unloading a container from the transport robot(unload). On the other hand, the transport
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Figure 2.3: Interaction between components involved in plan execution.
robot is able to move to and from two separate locations(loc1 and loc2). The set of actions
A = {put, take, load, unload, move1, move2}. The system can be in a number of configu-
rations or states, which are defined as S = {s0, s1, s2, s3, s4, s5}. The blue arrows between
each state represent the state-transition function γ indicating the transition from one state
to another, based on the valid execution of an action a.
The above scenario can be likened to a cyber security problem where a network of devices
is modelled instead of a dock with a crane and transport robot. This model could include
various types of devices which run software applications and have connectivity relations.
Configurations of these devices could be used to determine paths of compromised hosts in
an attack.
Several types of planning techniques exist, including Temporal Planning, Probabilistic Plan-
ning and Classical Planning. Temporal Planning is used to examine scenarios where the
timing of actions play a role in solving problems. This may be due to deadlines, resources
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Figure 2.4: State-transitions for a dock system involving a crane and transport robot[22].
limited by time or external events acting on the system. This planning technique imposes
time constraints on actions, which could symbolise the minimum or maximum duration
taken to complete a task. Probabilistic Planning uses information on the probabilities of
non-deterministic events, maximizing the probability of reaching designated goal sets. Clas-
sical Planning makes use of a unique known initial state and has durationless deterministic
actions, making it most suitable to the application of attack graph generation. For this
reason, Classical Planning will be elaborated on in the following sections.
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2.3.4 Restricted Planning Model
The conceptual planning model stated above represents an abstraction which can be devel-
oped upon to create a more operational model. In reality, the world is extremely complex and
can rarely be represented in states for a state-transition machine. Abstraction is key to sim-
plifying real environments into forms which can be more easily modelled. These assumptions
are described for the Restricted Planning Model below[20, p. 10]:
• Assumption 1: The state-transition system Σ has a finite number of states.
• Assumption 2: An observation of the state-transition system Σ contains complete
knowledge its state. At the time of execution, the planner will know the state of the
domain precisely.
• Assumption 3: The state-transition system Σ is deterministic, implying that there
can be only one outcome for each action.
• Assumption 4: The state-transition system Σ is static, such that no changes occur
until the controller issues an action.
• Assumption 5: Only restricted goals are handled by the planner, which are explicitly
specified. Goals including states to be avoided, utility functions or constraints are not
handled by the planner.
• Assumption 6: Solutions are an enumeration of a finite sequence of actions.
• Assumption 7: Actions and events are timeless and occur instantaneously.
• Assumption 8: The planner does not concern itself with any changes to the environ-
ment and reacts only to the initial and goal states provided to it.
Specification of these axioms becomes important for construction and abstraction of an
operational model, which can be used to evaluate an environment.
2.3.5 Classical Planning
Classical Planning pertains to planning models which are restricted and follow Assump-
tion 1 to Assumption 8[20, p. 17]. The state-transition system is based on the Restricted
Planning Model, with the exclusion of the set of events E, since the restrictive nature of the
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model has no unexpected or unpredictable events in it.
The state-transition system Σ is thus reduced to a triple defined by Σ = (S, A, γ), where S
represents a set of all possible states, A a set of all possible actions the planner can execute
and γ a set of all state transitions. Furthermore, a planing problem is defined as P = (Σ, s0,
g), where s0 is an initial state and g is a set of goal states. A solution to P can be written
as a sequence of actions 〈a1, a2,..., ak〉 corresponding to a sequence 〈s0, s1,..., sk〉 of state
transitions, such that s1 = γ(s0, a1), s2 = (γs1, a2),..., sk = γ(sk−1, ak), where sk is a valid
goal state[20, p. 17].
States
A state is in essence a set S of basic atoms which are used to define the details of a domain.
Atoms represent facts which hold true for a state s ∈ S. A set S is guaranteed to be finite,
since a domain is constructed of a finite number of atoms which may not be functions.
Operators
An operator consists of a triple o = (name(o), precondition(o), effect(o)). A name(o) com-
prises of a unique operator symbol and every variable used in o, a precondition(o) includes
literals which are required to be true for operator usage. For an operator o, precondition+(o)
represents a positive precondition(a precondition which is true), while precondition−(o) a
negative precondition(a precondition which is false). Lastly, an effect(o) contains literals
which are made to be true after the successful execution of an operator.
Actions
The notion of an action can be understood to mean an instance of a particular operator. Con-
sider a state s where an action a exists such that precondition+(o) ⊆ s and precondition−(o)
= ∅. Action a is defined as valid resulting in the evolution of s to state s′ via the state-
transition function γ(s, a).
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Representation of Planning Problems
A planning problem P = (Σ, s0, g) can be syntactically defined as a planning statement P
= (O, s0, g). P is in essence an instantiation of P .
Plan Solutions
A plan is defined as a sequence of actions π = 〈a1, a2, a3,...,an〉 ∀ n ∈ N. Each ai corresponds
with an operator in O. A plan π is a solution to a problem P if and only if the action sequence
of π can be successfully executed and also achieves some goal g [22].
2.3.6 State-Space Exploration
In classical planning there are several algorithms used in the exploration of state spaces.
These search algorithms use nodes to represent domain states and arcs to indicate state
transitions between states. The following sections will discuss two of the most commonly
used algorithms; namely Forward Chaining State Space Search and Backward Chaining State
Space Search or Forward-Search and Backward-Search respectively.
Forward Chaining State Space Search
Forward Chaining State Space Search is one of the two main techniques used in state space
exploration, based on the usage of inference rules for its reasoning. Forward-Search is said to
be complete, since if a solution exists to a problem P then a solution will be returned[22]. It
takes as an input statement the instantiation P = (O, s0, g) of P and performs a Forward-
Search returning a solution sequence, should the problem be solvable. It starts using available
data and uses inference rules to extract more data until a designated goal is achieved. In
Forward-Search, each new state s′ is generated using γ(s, a). Several implementations of
Forward-Search include:
• Breadth-first search
• Depth-first search
• Best-first search
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• Greedy search
The opposite state space search technique is Backward Chaining State Space Search, which
will be further described in the next section.
Backward Chaining State Space Search
The concept of Backward-Search is to start at the goal and apply the inverse of operators
in order to create subgoals, terminating at the generation of a set of subgoals satisfying the
initial state specified[20, p. 73]. In Backward-Search, each subgoal or previous state s is
generated using inverse transition function γ−1(s′, a). An action is selected and a set of
predecessor states is computed by applying the inverse transition function. A plan has been
found once the inverse transition function generates the initial state.
2.3.7 GRAPHPLAN Planning
A drawback of previous search algorithms is the large branching factor, affecting state space
search performance. This issue can be outlined in Backward-Searching where many actions
actions are attempted which cannot be reach from an initial state. Aiming to address this
issue and improve on planning techniques, A.L. Blum and M. L. Furst[23] with their planner,
named GRAPHPLAN. The algorithm begins by constructing a Planning Graph, which en-
codes the planning problem in a way that offers constraints in an explicit manner, reducing
search time. Planning Graphs incorporate domain information, goals, initial problem condi-
tions and the concept of time. GRAPHPLAN uses the Planning Graph to guide its search
in identifying solutions. It creates a relaxed problem4, removing some restrictions from the
original time, such that the relaxed problem can be solved in polynomial time. All solutions
identified in the relaxed problem will included those solutions to the original problem. A
modified search is performed on the original search, including only those actions occurring
in solutions to the relaxed problem.
4A relaxed planning problem essentially simplifies problem by reducing the computational costs of calcu-
lating a solution by ignoring certain parts of its specification.
23
CHAPTER 2. BACKGROUND
2.3.8 Heuristic Search Planning
The concept of HSP, developed by B. Bonet and H. Geffner[24], makes use of heuristics
to guide its search for a goal. A heuristic function h is used to try solve problem P , by
focusing on a relaxed version of the problem P ′, which ignores delete lists.5 The heuristic
function h(s) of a state s is set as an estimation of the optimal cost from a state s to a
goal state. It guides the planner through a hill-climbing search and terminates once it has
identified the goal. A hill-climbing search involves the selection of the best child nodes at
each interval until a goal is achieved. In the application of HSP, the best child nodes are
those which minimize h(s). Those states which have already been computed are stored in
rapidly accessible memory so that their values do not have to be recomputed and so that
they are excluded from the remainder of the search.
2.3.9 Fast-Forward Planning
J.Hoffmann[26] introduced the Fast-Forward planner, which was the most successful au-
tomated planner in the AIPS-2000 planning systems competition.6 The basic principle of
Fast-Forward is based on the HSP system, differing mainly in the technique used in obtaining
the heuristic function.
Fast-Forward approaches planning using a Forward-Search algorithm to explore the state
space, guiding it using a heuristic function. Furthermore, the heuristic function is also
derived by analysing a relaxed version of the problem, ignoring certain specifications, such as
delete lists. Hoffmann went by obtaining a heuristic function hFF (S ) of state S by running a
relaxed version of GRAPHPLAN. This relaxed version first builds the planning graph until
reaching all goals identified. The graph consists of layers of facts and actions, where the
initial layer contains the facts which are applicable to state S. After applying all actions to
these facts, the add lists7 effects are added to those which already exist to form the second
layer. This process is repeated to generate as many fact layers as required until all goals are
5Some planning systems refer to the set of negative literals or negative atoms as a delete lists[25].
6The Artificial Intelligence Planning and Scheduling Systems (AIPS) brings together researchers working
on various fields such as planning, scheduling, learning and plan execution. They play host to the world
planning competition, challenging the robustness of competitor planning software against a variety of problem
types[27].
7The add list can be viewed as the counterpart to the delete list, containing a set of the positive literals
or positive atoms.
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reached. A relaxed plan can then be extracted by starting at the very last fact layer m of
those including goals. Then for each layer i, should a goal exist in the previous layer i - 1,
it is added as a goal to achieve for the layer i - 1. If no goal exists at layer i - 1, an action is
selected from i - 1 which adds the goal and the action’s preconditions into the goals of layer
i - 1. Termination occurs upon reaching the very first layer, resulting in a relaxed action
sequence 〈O0,..., Om−1〉. The solution length is estimated based on this sequence by using
the function:
hff (S) =
∑
i=1,...,m−1
|Oi|∀i ∈ N
While the heuristic function can obtain a solution in polynomial time, the actual process
of searching the state space is still costly, prompting the usage of a more straight-forward
method. Fast-Forward uses and enforced hill-climbing search, which evaluates all successors
of a search state S for a state with a more optimal heuristic. If a better heuristic than
that of S is not discovered, the successor’s successors are evaluated and so forth. A state S ′
with a better heuristic than S is then added to the current plan, with the search continuing
from S ′ as the new starting state. In summary, Fast-Forward searches through states using
a breadth-first search which enforces solutions to have strictly better results. Should this
technique fail to find a solution, Fast-Forward switches to a weighted A* algorithm.8
An analysis comparing the performance of the Fast-Forward system and HSP was done.
Three main fields were focused on, including heuristic function acquisition, searching method
and pruning techniques, revealing an improved performance with Fast-Forward for each
domain tested.
2.3.10 Planning Domain Definition Language
The Planning Domain Definition Language (PDDL) is an action-centered language used in
automated planning to describe the environment of a domain. It was initially developed
for the International Planning Competition as a universal planning language to be used in
benchmarking planners. Such descriptions entail the kinds of predicates or literals available,
8A* uses a best-first search to find a least-cost path from an initial node to a goal node. It uses a heuristic
to follow the path of lowest cost, keeping a sorted queue of alternate paths as the algorithm progresses. The
algorithm differs from a greedy best-first search in that it tracks the distance already traveled.
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the structure of actions and the effects they produce[28]. PDDL was developed by deriving
certain concepts from several previous planning languages including ADL[29], SIPE-2[30],
Prodigy-4.0[31], UMCP[32], UNPOP[33] and UCPOP[34].
Domain Definition
In general, the domain definition describes the domain predicates and operators(known as
actions in PDDL), as well as constants and static axioms. In the context of a domain,
predicates have no intrinsic meaning and are use only to specify predicate names used in a
domain and their parameters. A predicate evolves according to the evaluation of an action,
whose effect can modify it, and by its initial instantiation in the problem definition. Actions
take in a list of predicates as parameters on which they operate. An action can be separated
into a precondition and effect section. The precondition section specifies a goal that must
be satisfied before an action is executed. These goals are based on the states of precondition
parameters specified as action input. Preconditions which are evaluated as true lead to the
execution of effects, which modify the current state of the domain by altering its predicates.
Problem Definition
The problem definition is responsible for specifying initial states of object in the problem
instance as well as the overall goal to search for. All atoms stated in the initialisation section
are set as true in the initial state, while all others are set as false. The goal description is
used to assign desired goals to a planning problem. These goals correspond with objects or
constant names rather than quantities.
2.4 Vulnerability Data Sources
In order to determine whether an exploit action can be executed during a specific state,
certain requirements must be satisfied. One of these preconditions is that there exists a
vulnerability on a reachable host, which would allow an attacker to either elevate his privi-
lege level on his currently compromised machine or gain privileges on an adjacent machine.
Vulnerable hosts are discovered based on software installed on these hosts. Information re-
garding the software vendor, name and version are cross-referenced with publicly available
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vulnerability information to determine the types of results an attacker could achieve. Several
vulnerability databases are available online, which would be suited for this solution. These
are:
• National Vulnerability Database (NVD)[11]
• Open-Source Vulnerability Database (OSVDB)[35]
• CERIAS Cooperative Web Vulnerability Database[36]
• Greedy search
In the Design Chapter we will compare the pros and cons of each of these databases, providing
insight into the most suitable choice to use for this research.
2.5 Chapter Summary
This chapter outlined three fields of interest, namely Security Information and Event Man-
agement (SIEM), security attack graphs and automated planning. SIEM has been widely
utilized within large enterprise networks as a means of centralised log management and real-
time analysis. A predictive security analysis approach could benefit from the pre-collected
and normalized log data of SIEMs, offering administrators an opportunity to identify po-
tential threats against a monitored network. These potential threats can be represented on
a network-wide scale by using attack graphs. Attack graphs offer a graph-based approach
to analysing network vulnerabilities, by showing how individual attacks can be composed
to create larger attack paths. Searching through entire state spaces for medium or large
networks quickly becomes infeasible due to the state-space explosion problem, prompting
the use of more practical means of graph exploration. Automated planning algorithms aid
in state-space exploration by guiding the search using heuristics rather than performing ex-
haustive searches. In the following chapter we will consider how these techniques can be
adapted and improved. We will provide a design for a prototype and specify an approach
for the extraction of exploit information from publicly available vulnerability databases.
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Design
In this chapter, we look at the design of the system architecture and outline the process em-
ployed in evaluating network security. The chapter is further broken down into three sections,
representing design layers, which serve to demonstrate the information flow throughout the
framework.
3.1 System Overview
In this chapter, the proof of concept framework is presented with an outline of its design
specifications. Network Vulnerability Analyser (NVA) uses a topological model of a network
to simulate the mechanics of an attack on it. In essence, NVA produces a specification for a
multi-step attack based on a network’s structure, device connectivity relations and software
installed on devices. It is aimed at benefiting network administrators, since by outlining
an attacker’s most likely strategy of attack one can anticipate potential attacks and apply
suitable countermeasures.
3.1.1 Typical Strategies of Attack
It is crucial to understand the typical methods employed by malicious users to compro-
mise critical network resources, in order to extrapolate a basis for the requirements which
drive the solution. Throughout an attack on network infrastructure, an attacker constantly
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performs reconnaissance on newly discovered devices as his knowledge of the infrastructure
increases. Reconnaissance incorporates enumeration of device information which could fur-
ther aid in the attack, such as services exposed to him. Once versioning information is
retrieved regarding these exposed services, it can be cross-referenced with a vulnerability
database to explore potential weaknesses which may allow him unauthorized access. Suc-
cessful exploitation of discovered vulnerabilities may lead to access to the vulnerable device,
with administrative or user-level permissions. It may not be necessary for an attacker to gain
administrative access to a target if the goal is to merely use it as a pivoting point to launch
attacks against other devices. This process of vulnerability enumeration and exploitation
is the driving factor behind the design of NVA. While in reality there are many more fac-
tors to take into account when exploiting a vulnerability, these complexities were ignored in
order to focus on the application of the automated planning aspect of attack path generation.
3.1.2 Considerations for Design Requirements
NVA requires information from numerous sources in order to be able to perform attack path
computations. The solution is dependent on a computer-readable description of the network
topology being assessed and access to vulnerability information. Conducting automated dis-
covery and mapping of network topology requires the discovery of routers, switches, firewalls,
load balancers, servers and workstations. This task is requires a significant amount of time
and effort and was not deemed as part of the scope of this thesis. Consequently, static XML
descriptions of network topologies were generated for testing purposes. The potential for
NVA to receive topological descriptions from automated mapping and discovery tools has
been left as future work.
The solution focusses on the exploitation of vulnerabilities which result in unauthorised
access to devices. As such it can only evaluate a subset of scenario, since it does not model
attacks which affect the availability of devices or confidentiality of data.
The architecture of NVA is illustrated in Figure 3.1, and is comprised of three layers: (I)
Information Aggregation, (II) Attack Graph Computation and (III) Visualization.
Information Aggregation is performed by the Network Configuration Transformer, whose
responsibility is taking an XML network configuration file and parsing it to create an object-
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Figure 3.1: An overview of NVA architecture, including various layers involved in com-
putation of attack graphs.
based model of the network. The network model is stored in memory so that it can be easily
manipulated for graph analysis operations. The Network Configuration Transformer also
generates an artefact of the network model called Problem PDDL, which acts as an interface
between the Information Aggregation layer and Attack Graph Computation layer,
as well as input for the Attack Graph Constructor module. The Problem PDDL is basically
a description of the scenario to be processed by the planner, described in more detail in
section 3.5.6.
The Attack Graph Computation layer forms the bulk of the processing load, incorporat-
ing the most vital functions of NVA in the attack graph generation process. At the center
of this layer is the Attack Graph Constructor module, responsible for managing the network
model and all generated attack graph models for the network, storing all executable exploit
actions and most importantly, interfacing with the planner. Before the Attack Graph Con-
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structor can perform any processes it needs to retrieve a detailed description of possible
executable exploits it can use, obtained directly from the vulnerability database. Vulnera-
bilities are extracted from the vulnerability database using the Vulnerability Extractor. The
Vulnerability Extractor parses the vulnerability database and creates a hash table of vulner-
ability objects using unique vulnerability identifiers as keys. The vast amount of vulnerabil-
ities stored in the database are not all required in computation of attack graphs. Therefore,
the Vulnerability Extractor cross-references the software installed on devices in the network
with extracted vulnerabilities to create a subset of vulnerabilities, used to generate atomic
exploit actions. By creating a subset of vulnerabilities it minimizes the amount of possible
actions planner has to perform, improving performance time. The Vulnerability Extractor
then uses the metrics available within the extracted vulnerability subset to create atomic
exploit actions by enumerating preconditions for successful exploitation and the postcondi-
tions thereafter. These exploits are listed in the domain PDDL, which is fed to the Attack
Graph Computation module. The Domain PDDL, Problem PDDL and an attacker’s target
are crucial elements in producing an attack plan. They are used as input to the planner,
where the Problem PDDL describes the environment of the problem and the Domain PDDL
lists the kinds of actions its capable of performing.
Should the planner identify a solution to the problem it outputs a Critical Attack Graph
Model. This model acts as an interfacing component between the Attack Graph Compu-
tation layer and Visualization layer and is displayed to the user in NVA’s attack graph
visualizer. The user can interact with the Critical Attack Graph Model via the GUI and
regenerate attack graphs dynamically, taking into account any modifications.
3.2 Extracting Data from a Vulnerability Database -
Layer I
3.2.1 Sources of Vulnerability Data
Vulnerability information is generally available from two sources; namely commercial and
non-profit organizations. Since commercial security organizations often do not publish all of
their vulnerability information, non-profit sources are focused on. This section is involved
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in Information Aggregation of vulnerability data required in device product evaluation.
It also examines some of the most popular non-profit vulnerability providers. The type of
vulnerability information each of them offers is analysed to determine which source may be
the most beneficial in the context of attack graph generation.
Open-Source Vulnerability Database (OSVDB)
OSVDB1 is geared towards offering detailed and current information to the online commu-
nity. Launched in 2002, the project aimed to implement a vulnerability database which is
open for free use and has no restrictions on its content. OSVDB runs as a web applica-
tion with a front-end offering vulnerability searches and a back-end whose content is openly
available to updates[35]. A relational database is used to store vulnerability information and
is maintained entirely by the open-source community. OSVDB essentially relies on secu-
rity experts and the power of the open-source development model to identify and document
vulnerability information in its database.
CERIAS Cooperative Web Vulnerability Database
Based on a previous vulnerability database project whose information was kept internally,
the CERIAS Cooperative Web Vulnerability Database (WebVDB) was built into a more
robust system made available to the public. Similar to OSVDB, WebVDB uses a relational
database engine efficient for storage and retrieval of large amount of vulnerability data.
However, WebVDB makes use of a voting mechanism utilized by groups of reviewers to verify
the correctness of vulnerabilities submitted by users. By voting a reviewer indicates their
level of confidence in a vulnerability’s correctness. The accumulation of these votes decide
whether a vulnerability and its information is released to the public or if any corrections
are necessary. Furthermore, unlike OSVDB, WebVDB is not open-source and relies on two
types of user groups to manage the vulnerabilities in the database. The first group, known as
normal users, have sufficient privileges to submit vulnerabilities and edit their submissions.
The second group, known as editors, have a privilege level which comprises of normal user
privileges as well as the ability to edit any vulnerabilities and vote for them[36].
1http://www.osvdb.org
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National Vulnerability Database (NVD)
NVD2 was created as a repository of standardised vulnerability data for the U.S. govern-
ment. Structured vulnerability data enables the automation of vulnerability management,
security measurement and compliance. It incorporates databases of security checklists, secu-
rity related software flaws, misconfigurations, product names and impact metrics. NVD is a
project sponsored by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s National Cyber Security
Division and is geared towards helping agencies such as the National Security Agency (NSA)
and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
3.2.2 Motivation for Vulnerability Source Selection
In this section we examine the information provided by the aforementioned vulnerability
databases. A comparison is made based on the information they provide on a vulnerabil-
ity, to help make an informed decision about which one will be most beneficial for building
attack graphs. The key aspects considered for analysing how databases present vulnera-
bilities include naming conventions, descriptions, Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
(CVE)[37] reference, operating system, software, access vector, access complexity, authenti-
cation, CVSS, impact, references, format, release date and last update. Table 3.1 provides
an overview of the information offered by OSVDB, WebVDB and NVD.
2http://nvd.nist.gov
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Table 3.1 A comparison of data offered by several popular vulnerability databases[38].
OSVDB WebVDB NVD
Title X X
Description X X X
CVE Reference X X X
OS X X X
Software X X
Access Vector X X X
Access Complexity X
Authentication X
CVSS X
Impact X X X
References X X X
Format HTML CSV/HTML/MySQL/XML HTML/XML
Release Date X X
Last Update X X
When considering which database to use as a data source, the extractability of data must
be examined. For example, a database which uses easily identifiable fields makes for easier
extraction with a parser, as opposed to entries which are only human-readable. This has
been a deciding factor in the selection of OSVDB, WebVDB and NVD, since they present
vulnerability data in common formats which aide extraction. Fields used in comparing each
of the vulnerability databases are further described below.
The first group of fields is used in identifying vulnerabilities. Human-readable titles are
provided by OSVDB and WebVDB to provide a brief explanation of what a vulnerability
is, however this information is not useful in terms of attack graph construction. A more
thorough description of a vulnerability is offered by all three databases, providing human-
readable information to better understand the detail behind it. Vulnerabilities are described
using a standardised format using the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures list, which
provides identifiers for all known vulnerabilities[37]. This standardised identifier is used
widely amongst the majority of vulnerability databases and is the generally accepted format
for labelling vulnerabilities. Universal usage of CVE identifiers is key since it supplies unique
identifier for each vulnerability which is computer-readable. All three databases utilize CVE
identifiers as a naming convention for their vulnerabilities.
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The second group of fields is concerned with information which NVA can use in attack graph
construction and reachability of targets. The access vector field describes how an attacker
would need to access a vulnerable device to exploit its vulnerability. Access complexity
defines the difficulty an attacker faces in successfully executing an exploit against a vulner-
ability. Authentication defines the amount of times an attacker is required to authenticate
with a target device to exploit it. All of the fields in this group are further explained in the
Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) in the next section.
The third group contains information which NVA is able to use in identifying critical attack
paths within networks. The CVSS severity score defines the risk of a vulnerability and is
used in determining the overall security level of a network. The impact field can be used
to gather information on the postconditions of an attack. For example, it may state that
successful exploitation of a vulnerability offers an attacker root access to the target device,
providing the attacker with access to every given resource. NVA uses this kind of informa-
tion in determining threat mitigation strategies, aggregating the impact of vulnerabilities to
compute the maximum damage an attacker may be able to cause on a network.
In the fourth group we consider any references provided by vendors of vulnerable software.
They can supply more information for a vulnerability, including patches and all affected
software versions. These references can help a user to find more information on updates
or patches for vulnerable software. Another advantage of these references is the ability to
find information for a vulnerability on other databases without having to know the vendor-
specific ID for the weakness. By providing URLs to other sites hosting information about a
particular vulnerability, it allows pages to be found more easily.
Most vulnerability information is only offered in HTML format as descriptions. The disad-
vantage of HTML is that it makes data extraction challenging, since a site-specific parser
needs to be built to scrape vulnerability data out. This process can be computationally
expensive and detracts from actual problem at hand; attack graph construction. Only the
NVD and OSVDB offer data in additional formats to HTML, such as XML.
Finally, the last group presents the release date and latest update date. While this informa-
tion provides no extra value in terms of attack graph construction it helps in determining
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the freshness of a report and whether a vulnerability description is outdated.
From Table 3.1 it can be seen that the NVD offers most of the required vulnerability in-
formation. A crucial advantage it also provides is that it makes data available in an XML
format, drastically reducing the amount of work needed for data extraction. Furthermore,
NVD includes vulnerability information using the CVSS, which includes all of the necessary
fields required for NVA to build attack graphs. For these reasons, NVD was selected as the
source for vulnerability information to use in attack graph generation.
3.3 Common Vulnerability Scoring System
Vulnerability assessment has been challenging in the past, since vulnerabilities need to be
identified and analysed across a variety of disparate hardware and software platforms. An
organization may be host to a mountain of vulnerabilities, where each vulnerability poses a
different level of risk. When there are so many to fix it can be difficult for an IT manager to
know where to start. The Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) helps to address
this issue by offering an open framework which can aide in prioritizing vulnerability resolu-
tion, according to a severity score[39]. By using an open framework it allows any user to see
individual characteristics of a vulnerability used in deriving its severity score.
While no organization owns CVSS, it is under custodial care of the Forum of Incident Re-
sponse and Security Teams (FIRST).3 Organizations that make use of CVSS include vul-
nerability bulletin providers, software application vendors, private-sector user organizations
vulnerability scanning and management organizations, security risk management firms and
researchers.
3.3.1 Ranking Vulnerabilities Using Metrics
CVSS can be broken down into three groups of metrics; namely Base, Temporal and Envi-
ronmental, each of which contain subsets of metrics. Figure 3.2 shows these groups as well
as the metrics they comprise of.
3www.first.org/cvss
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Figure 3.2: CVSS groups comprising of several metrics which determine a vulnerability’s
severity score.
The CVSS score is computed using a function which is a combination of the base, temporal
and environmental metric groups. Each metric group is represented as a vector function,
comprised of the values for each metric shown in Figure 3.2. This not only provides the
user with an overall CVSS score but also a more detailed break down which can be used to
communicate exactly how the score for a vulnerability is derived.
3.3.2 Base Metrics
The base metric group looks at those characteristics of a vulnerability which are static and
independent of time and the infrastructure environment. A description of how a vulner-
ability is accessed and the conditions required to do so is provided by the Access Vector,
Access Complexity and Authentication metrics. On the other hand, Confidentiality Impact,
Integrity Impact and Availability Impact define the effect of the successful exploitation of a
vulnerability. The three impact metrics help to define the degree of loss of confidentiality,
integrity and availability.
Access Vector
This metric describes the type of access an attacker requires to exploit a vulnerability. Table
3.2 shows the values available to the type of access to a target host. The ability for an
attacker to exploit a vulnerability remotely will achieve a much higher score than one that
requires local access to a targeted device. This owes to the fact that a remote vulnerability
allows access to a host across a network, without having to perform any preparatory attack
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steps to initially gain access to the host via another vulnerability.
Table 3.2 Access vector values[39].
Metric Value Description
Local This requires the attacker to have local access to the target de-
vice. What this entails is either physical access or access via a shell
account.
Adjacent Network Vulnerabilities which are exploitable via an adjacent network offer
an attacker access if they have access to the broadcast domain or
IP subnet of the target device.
Network A vulnerability which requires network access is dangerous since it
does not require local network access or physical access. It is bound
to the network, making it increasingly exploitable since devices are
often connected to the network. Without firewalls in place within
a network infrastructure, these vulnerable devices may be visible
to anyone on the internet. This danger achieves network accessible
vulnerabilities the highest score.
Access Complexity
The complexity of an attack on a vulnerable device is categorized with this metric, once
the attacker has gained access using the aforementioned access vector. The degree of access
complexity is defined by the number of steps required to successfully exploit a vulnerability.
For example, a buffer overflow vulnerability in a Microsoft Internet Information Server (IIS)
may be executed as soon as the attacker gains access to the target device. Conversely, a
prerequisite for a vulnerable chat client may be that a user needs to interact with the attack,
such as clicking on a link provided by the attacker. Such a scenario would achieve a lower
score than the first example. Degrees of access complexity are further explained in Table
3.3.
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Table 3.3 Access complexity values[39].
Metric Value Description
High Require specialised access conditions before a vulnerability can suc-
cessfully be exploited. This may entail the attacker already having
a certain privilege level or making use of social engineering to carry
out an attack. Furthermore, it might require certain rare and vul-
nerable conditions to be in place.
Medium Access conditions are fairly intricate but not as difficult to satisfy.
This level of complexity might involve an attacker gaining access to
the target device within a broad usergroup and could even include
untrusted users. It could also require that some information be
obtained to carry out and exploit.
Low This degree of access complexity does not require any specialised
conditions to be in place. It is likely to be present in scenarios where
a vulnerable product requires access to a wide range of systems and
usergroups or an attack require little skill or additional information
to be gathered.
Authentication
This metric looks at the amount of times an attacker is required to authenticate with the
target device in order to exploit a vulnerability on it. For simplicity’s sake, it does not take
into account the complexity of the authentication process, only the number of authentications
required. The scale of authentication values consists of three values shown in Table 3.4.
Table 3.4 Authentication values[39].
Metric Value Description
Multiple The attacker needs to authenticate with the target device more
than two times.
Single The authentication process only needs to be executed once for an
attacker to exploit a vulnerability.
None No authentication is required to exploit a vulnerability.
Confidentiality Impact
Data confidentiality is whether information stored on a system is protected against unin-
tended or unauthorized access. In this context, confidentiality impact is the measure of
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damage on confidentiality should an attacker successfully exploit a vulnerability on a sys-
tem. Possible values for this metric are listed in Table 3.5, decreasing in confidentiality
impact score.
Table 3.5 Confidentiality impact values[39].
Metric Value Description
Complete An attacker has total information disclosure of the target device,
allowing him to read all of its data.
Partial Information is leaked to the attacker, however the attacker does not
have control over what is revealed. In such a scenario only limited
amounts of information are disclosed.
None There is no risk of any information being compromised on the target
device.
Integrity Impact
Integrity refers to maintaining and assuring the accuracy and consistency of data in a system.
Integrity impact describes the level of compromise and effect caused by an attacker on a
target device’s data integrity. Table 3.6 shows the values for this metric, decreasing in score.
Table 3.6 Integrity impact values[39].
Metric Value Description
Complete The entire system is compromised and all data is at risk of being
altered. No data on the target device is protected from modifica-
tion.
Partial The system is partially impacted by data integrity issues. The
attack is capable of modifying some data, however does not have
complete control over what can be modified.
None No impact on data integrity is caused.
Availability Impact
Availability describes the level of accessibility of information resources. Attacks against
the availability of systems are referred to as Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, and include
the consumption of network bandwidth, processor cycles, disk space and shutting down
services. Availability impact is a metric which measures the impact a vulnerability has
40
CHAPTER 3. DESIGN
on the availability of services if successfully exploited. Values defined for this metric are
described further in Table 3.7.
Table 3.7 Availability impact values[39].
Metric Value Description
Complete The attacker has complete control of the target device’s resources
and can render them totally unavailable.
Partial Resource availability and performance is drastically reduced. Re-
source availability is interrupted or limited access is available.
None No impact on data availability is caused.
3.3.3 Temporal Metrics
The temporal metrics group is concerned with elements of vulnerabilities which change over
time. Factors that are considered in this group included the exploitability of a vulnerability,
the remediation status of it and the level of confidence in a vulnerability’s report. The
temporal metric group is optional, therefore each metric group has a value which can be
used that has no effect on the overall score.
Exploitability
Exploitability looks at the current availability of methods or source code which can be used
to exploit a vulnerability. Furthermore, it considers how easy publicly available source code
or methods are to use, increasing the score if they require little skill. The possible values
used in the exploitability scoring system are listed in Table 3.8.
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Table 3.8 Exploitability values[39].
Metric Value Description
Unproven No exploit code or methods are available.
Proof-of-Concept When vulnerabilities are initially discovered in the real world,
proof-of-concept code is developed, which acts as very functional
exploit code for demonstration purposes only. This code is not
functional in all scenarios and generally requires a large amount of
modification to suit specific situations.
High The vulnerability has widely available exploit code or needs no code
at all to execute thoroughly documented steps manually. In such
cases, coded or methods work every time.
Not Defined Assignment of this value will exclude this metric from the overall
score.
Remediation Level
This metric looks at the state of a vulnerability’s patch. When a vulnerability is first
discovered it usually requires that the vendor or a third-party organization release a patch
or upgrade. Prior to this, hotfixes or workaround may be released to address the issue in the
interim. The remediation level score is affected by the stage of remediation a vulnerability
is in, where an unpatched vulnerability attains the highest score and decreases throughout
each stage. Table 3.9 shows the possible values available for this metric.
Table 3.9 Remediation level values[39].
Metric Value Description
Official Fix A total update to the issue is provided by the software vendor.
Temporary Fix The official vendor provides a temporary fix while a more steady
fix is developed on.
Workaround There is a non-official workaround or patch provided by other users
who have encountered the vulnerability.
Unavailable No solution is available to the vulnerability or it is impossible to
fix.
Not Defined Assignment of this value will exclude this metric from the overall
score.
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Report Confidence
Report confidence looks at how credible the official report of a vulnerability really is and
the level of detail provided on it. Often, vulnerabilities are publicised without any technical
details outlining the problem. At a later stage these vulnerabilities may be confirmed by
the software vendors or author of the vulnerability. The degree of confidence in a report
is broken down and shown in Table 3.10, where confirmed reports gain the highest score
possible.
Table 3.10 Report confidence values[39].
Metric Value Description
Confirmed A vulnerability is confirmed to exist by either the software vendor or
author of the vulnerability. High levels of confidence are associated
with these reports and they may include proof-of-concept exploit
code.
Uncorroborated Multiple non-official reports exist for a vulnerability, which may
have conflicting technical details.
Unconfirmed A single unconfirmed report exists or multiple conflicting reports
exist. There is a very low level of confidence in such a report and
they usually surface from hacker sources.
Not Defined Assignment of this value will exclude this metric from the overall
score.
3.3.4 Environmental Metrics
The environmental group, similar to the temporal group, is used to paint a more intricate
picture of a vulnerability and the effects it has on a computing environment. It tries to
capture the details of a vulnerability in the environment, since different environments can
affect the risk level a vulnerability poses to an organization. Moreover, the environmental
metrics group is also optional and can be disregarded from the total severity score. Included
in this group is the collateral damage potential, target distribution and security requirements
of an environment.
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Collateral Damage Potential
Collateral damage potential measures the danger a vulnerability can potentially have on a
working environment, ranging from loss of life or damage physical assets to theft of data.
Incorporated into this metric is the potential for a vulnerability to affect an organization’s
productivity or revenue. Vulnerabilities with a higher collateral damage potential in a par-
ticular organization gain a higher score. Table 3.11 reflects the different kinds of values
available for rating this metric.
Table 3.11 Collateral damage potential values[39].
Metric Value Description
High Successful execution of an exploit against the organization has dis-
astrous consequences, with large-scale physical damage or property
loss. The repercussions of an attack on such a vulnerability will
affect the organization’s productivity or revenue.
Medium-High Exploitation of such a vulnerability results in a significant degree
of physical damage or property loss.
Low-Medium A moderate degree of physical damage or property loss will result
from the successful exploitation of the vulnerability.
Low Exploitation of this vulnerability results in slight loss of property
or physical damage.
None No loss of property or physical damage is experience by successful
exploitation of this vulnerability.
Not Defined Assignment of this value will exclude this metric from the overall
score.
Target Distribution
This metric is used as an indicator for the quantity of devices in an organization which are
affected by a vulnerability. The target distribution metric is very much environment-specific
and depends on the types of software and services present on devices in a network. The
proportion of devices with an existing target vulnerability determines the score level for this
metric, where a larger proportion implies a higher score. Table 3.12 indicates the proportion
ranges used in deciding this score.
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Table 3.12 Target distribution values[39].
Metric Value Description
High Between 76% and 100% of devices are at risk in the environment.
Medium Between 26% and 75% of devices are at risk in the environment.
Low No target devices exist in the environment.
Not Defined Assignment of this value will exclude this metric from the overall
score.
Security Requirements
Three submetrics comprise security requirements; namely availability, confidentiality and
integrity. Base metric scores can be adjusted by modifying the availability, confidentiality and
integrity of assets in an organization, depending on the organization’s priorities. For example,
an organization with assets which are key to business functions may be assigned higher
priority in availability, rather than confidentiality and integrity. Security requirement metrics
correspond with their counterpart impact metrics: availability impact, confidentiality impact
and integrity impact. These metrics are linked, in that a higher availability requirement
increases the weighting of the availability impact and so forth. Table 3.13 shows the possible
values used in this metric.
Table 3.13 Security requirements values[39].
Metric Value Description
High Loss of confidentiality, integrity or availability will have disastrous
effects on the organization.
Medium Loss of confidentiality, integrity or availability will have serious ef-
fects on the organization and may affect users.
Low Loss of confidentiality, integrity or availability will only have limited
effects on the organization.
Not Defined Assignment of this value will exclude this metric from the overall
score.
3.3.5 Calculation of Vulnerability Severity
CVSS provides a framework for the calculation of a vulnerability’s severity rating, between
one and ten. Each of the scores for the above mentioned metric groups is calculated using
a set of independent equations. Using the generated scores, an administrator can make
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an informed decision on which devices and software to patch in a network. This project
looks at the automated aspects of identifying critical paths of devices and software to patch.
For this reason, the temporal and environmental metric groups have been neglected, since
they require tailored input from and administrator or security expert. The main source
of vulnerability information will be deduced from the base metric group. CVSS states the
formula to compute the base metric group as follows.
BaseScore = round_to_1_decimal(((0.6*Impact)+(0.4*Exploitability)1.5)*f(Impact))
Impact = 10.41*(1-(1-ConfImpact)*(1-IntegImpact)*(1-AvailImpact))
Exploitability = 20*AccessVector*AccessComplexity*Authentication
f(impact) = 0 if Impact=0, 1.176 otherwise
AccessVector = Local Accessible: 0.395
Adjacent Network Accessible: 0.646
Network Accessible: 1.0
AccessComplexity = High: 0.35
Medium: 0.61
Low: 0.71
Authentication = Requires Multiple Authentications: 0.45
Requires Single Authentication: 0.56
No Authentication Required: 0.704
ConfImpact = None: 0.0
Partial: 0.275
Complete: 0.660
IntegImpact = None: 0.0
Partial: 0.275
Complete: 0.660
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AvailImpact = None: 0.0
Partial: 0.275
Complete: 0.660
The above equations are further illustrated using an example of a vulnerability taken directly
from NVD. For the purpose of this project only the base metric group is used to provide
a base severity score, using information provided with the vulnerability report. NVA uses
base metric scores, which have already been precomputed and stored in NVD.
3.3.6 Example of Vulnerability Severity Score Calculation
This example will look at a vulnerability called CVE-2002-0392, discovered in June 2002.
It was a vulnerability in the Apache Web Server which, when exploited successfully, could
lead to a denial of service attack or the execution of arbitrary code with web server level
privileges.
This vulnerability can be exploited remotely, meaning that the Access Vector is Network Ac-
cessible. No additional circumstances, such as social engineering attack vectors, are required
in the execution of an exploit against this vulnerability. This infers that the vulnerability’s
Access Complexity is Low. The Authentication metric is set to None since no authentication
with the web server to remotely exploit this vulnerability.
Exploitation of this vulnerability can result in two outcomes, namely denial of service or
execution of arbitrary code with web server permission privileges. Each of these outcomes
affects the base score differently since they incorporate different metrics into the base score
equations. In computing the base score, the outcome which produces the greater base score
is selected.
If the vulnerability is exploited with the intent to execute arbitrary code with the web server
permission level, the Confidentiality and Integrity Impact metrics are set to Partial. This
is due to the fact that the attacker doesn’t have complete control over what is accessible.
Moreover, the attacker only has the privilege level of the web server, which may not be the
root or administrator privilege level, usually required for accessing sensitive system files and
credential information.
If the vulnerability if exploited in order to cause a denial of service attack, the Availability
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Impact is set to Complete. A denial of service is highly effective against this version of
Apache Web Server, rendering it unavailable.
Below is a comparison of the results generated by the above mentioned attack vectors,
illustrating how each metric is combined to produce the base score. Table 3.14 shows the
results of an exploit successfully run against CVE-2002-0392 to exploit arbitrary code at
web server level.
Table 3.14 Calculation of CVE-2002-0392 severity score in an attack geared towards arbi-
trary code execution.
Base Metric Evaluation Score
Access Vector Network 1.00
Access Complexity Low 0.71
Authentication None 0.704
Confidentiality Impact Partial 0.275
Integrity Impact Partial 0.275
Availability Impact None 0.00
Impact = 10.41 * (1 - (0.725) * (0.725) * (1)) = 4.9
Exploitability = 20 * 1 * 0.71 * 0.704 = 10.0
f(Impact) = 1.176
BaseScore = ((0.6 * 4.9) + (0.4 * 10) - 1.5) * 1.176 = 6.4
Table 3.15 shows the results of an exploit geared towards a denial of service attack against
the Apache web server.
Table 3.15 Calculation of CVE-2002-0392 severity score in a denial of service scenario.
Base Metric Evaluation Score
Access Vector Network 1.00
Access Complexity Low 0.71
Authentication None 0.704
Confidentiality Impact Partial 0.00
Integrity Impact Partial 0.00
Availability Impact None 0.66
Impact = 10.41 * (1 - (1) * (1) * (0.34)) = 6.9
Exploitability = 20 * 0.71 * 0.704 * 1 = 10.0
f(Impact) = 1.176
BaseScore = ((0.6 * 6.9) + (0.4 * 10.0) 1.5) * 1.176 = 7.8
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The comparison above reveals that exploiting CVE-2002-0392 to execute arbitrary code
achieves a base score of 6.4, while exploiting it as a denial of service attack achieves 7.8. The
highest score of the two is selected as the official severity rating, displayed on the vulnerability
report.
3.4 Network Configuration Sources - Layer I
One of the key inputs required in the Information Aggregation layer is a layout of the
network being evaluated. In order to map out the structure of the network being modelled,
topological information is required, incorporating facts about network devices and the con-
nectivity relations between them. Moreover, it is crucial to supply a detailed list of the kinds
of products installed on each device to support the discovery of vulnerability identification.
This information is required to gather a vulnerability’s security metric data from a vulner-
ability database as well as extract details required to construct exploit actions. Currently
NVA does not facilitate the transformation of network data from other sources into the NVA
file format, however this is deemed as an opportunity for future work. The conversion of
this information from external sources could be performed by constructing plugins for each
source. This thesis assumes that modelling of networks will be done independently of NVA,
using third-party tools. Listed below are some of the more popular tools used in network
discovery and vulnerability identification:
1. NMAP is a security scanner used to discover devices and services on networks, while
also mapping out the network structure[40]. It achieves this by transmitting specially
crafted packets to target devices and analysing the responses. Some of the key features
offered by NMAP include host discovery, port scanning, application version detection
and operating system detection.
2. Nessus is a vulnerability scanning program whose goal is to detect vulnerabilities on
tested systems[41]. Nessus scans search for vulnerabilities based on software installed
on devices, misconfigurations and also default password usage. Using tools such as
Nessus can help provide NVA with an enumeration of existing vulnerabilities on devices.
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3.4.1 Using a SIEM to Obtain Network Information
In the Background Chapter, we discussed the concept of SIEM, which aims at providing
reporting, event archiving, real-time security analysis and alert generation. These functions
draw knowledge from events generated by devices in a network and the applications installed
on them. Edge-side agents are installed on devices which report back to event aggregation
modules, which communicates with a central management system. This architecture provides
the opportunity to perform automated network discovery and aggregate device configuration
information. This SIEM process is highly beneficial, since although this information could be
gathered manually, it quickly becomes impractical for the framework to gather information
for a large-scale network of more than 50 devices.
3.4.2 Input File Format
NVA reads network configuration files stored in an Extensible Markup Language (XML)
format. XML is easy for computers to read and its tree-based structure is suitable to this
scenario’s structure. In Figure 3.3 the structure of data entries in a network configuration file
is shown, illustrating the relationship between elements of a network and their information.
Figure 3.3: The hierachical structure of elements in a network configuration file.
Another benefit of the XML format is the fact that it can be used on a wide variety of
platforms and can be interpreted by many tools. This translates to high interoperability
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owing to the fact that information supplied from other applications can be easily translated
into the required XML structure of an NVA network configuration file via a simple parser
plugin.
3.5 Constructing Multi-Step Network Attacks as Plannable
Problems - Layer II
3.5.1 Modelling of Devices on the Network and Topology
This section discusses what information is required to model a network and how elements
relate to each other. Attack graph construction techniques are currently restricted to model
attacker privilege levels on exploited hosts, since the most abundant sources of vulnerability
information only offer postconditions in terms of privilege escalation levels. All entities
described here are considered part of the problem or scenario description.
Network Devices
All devices modelled, including hosts, routers, switches and the attacker are incorporated
into a larger network model. Network models are based on input which describes the topology
of the network to be tested, provided in an XML file. The aggregation of this information
is not within the scope of NVA, however it can be gathered using other third party network
discovery tools, mentioned in Section 3.4. The attacker is modelled as a host which is initially
compromised, and has the ability to connect to a variety of specified hosts in the network.
Information stored within the network and attack models is later used in computation of
attack graphs by transforming the model into a PDDL representation called the problem.
Device Connectivity Relationships
Network connections between devices in a network are described using a pair-wise rela-
tionship called an IP connection. Devices can only access each other if there exists an IP
connection between them to facilitate communication. In general, all hosts within a sub-
network have connectivity between each other since communication within subnetworks are
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typically unrestricted, unless explicitly restricted by a firewall. In reality, there are a lot
more intricacies which govern how hosts are connected. However, it is felt that this simplifi-
cation is acceptable for this research, since the focus is around attack path optimization and
not information aggregation. Future work may entail information aggregation from routers
and firewalls to help construct connectivity relations between hosts. Hosts may however
be restricted to what they can access in other subnets, based on firewall constraints. It is
important to note that while firewalls are not explicitly modelled, their connection rules are
by stating what each device is capable of accessing. Future work may incorporate rules from
actual firewalls to add restraints on device accessibility within networks.
Host Models
The core focus in computing attack graphs from the aforementioned model revolves around
the vulnerability of hosts and their accessibility from an attacker. Hosts in the network
offer crucial pieces of information which can be used to discover likely attack vectors. Each
host has a unique IP address and hostname, used as identifiers for both administrators
analysing the network as well as the planner, which requires that each object be uniquely
identifiable. Additionally, they can be assigned asset values, between one and ten, based on
the importance of their function in the network. This is used in identifying suitable hosts to
patch within critical attack paths while also prioritizing the search based their asset values.
For example, in enterprise network where client information is stored in a database, a high
asset value would be assigned to its database server while assigning a lower asset value would
be assigned to a workstation in the accounting department. This is because the database
server stores important and confidential client information and requires high availability.
Product Models
Products running on hosts are enumerated within the network description and provide insight
into software weaknesses. A product comprises of a vendor name, product name and version.
This information is used to perform a vulnerability assessment on each host within the
network, by comparing products with vulnerability entries in NVD.
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Figure 3.4: An illustration of fields used in vulnerability entries from NVD which are
extracted for usage in exploit action encoding.
Vulnerability Models and Assessment of Vulnerable Products on Modelled De-
vices
Vulnerabilities discovered in performing a vulnerability assessment are stored within each
host model. Prior versions of NVA provided product information to the planner, requiring
it to perform cross-correlation with listed vulnerabilities. The issue with this technique is
that it entailed explicit enumeration of every possible vulnerability in the planner’s domain
description. This meant that every potential vulnerability was tested for each step of an
attack, resulting in the planner rapidly running out of memory and processing resources.
Performing vulnerability assessments as a pre-processing task takes the load off of the planner
and also means that only vulnerabilities related to the problem need to be encoded into
exploits and enumerated in the domain description. In doing so, the amount of potential
exploit actions the planner needs to test for each step of the attack process is drastically
reduced. Discovered vulnerabilities are stored within host models using their CVE identifiers
to reduce resource consumption. Figure 3.4 summarises the fields from vulnerability entries
in NVD that are used to encode exploit actions.
Exploit Models
Exploit actions are constructed by drawing on information provided by NVD, used in defining
potential actions for the planner to utilize. State-transitions are performed by the planner by
selecting appropriate actions in the domain description to shift to a new state. Actions are
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defined by preconditions required for execution and the resulting postconditions there of. In
this case, actions are encoded exploits, based on vulnerabilities, indicating the requirements
for an attack to be carried out and the resulting state the attack leaves the network in.
Exploits are stored within the domain file using the syntax defined for actions in PDDL,
illustrated in Figure 3.5.
Figure 3.5: Exploits are structured into preconditions and postconditions, based on
information provided by NVD vulnerability entries.
An exploit action consists of a unique identifier, device parameters, preconditions that need
to be satisfied to perform it and the resultant postconditions. Exploit actions use the CVE
identifier as an exploit action identifier, since they are unique and machine-readable from
NVD. Below the exploit action identifier is a list of parameters which are used in both the
preconditions and postconditions. These parameters include the attacker’s host, the source
host and the target host. The structure and construction of exploit models will be further
elaborated on below, in Section 3.5.2.
Attacker Models
An attacker is based on the same model as a standard host, differing in that products are
omitted. Products can be omitted since an attacker is the source of an attack, targeting other
hosts with software vulnerabilities. Device connectivity for an attacker is defined similarly
to any other network device, using IP Connections to describe what it can connect to.
Furthermore, an attacker’s set of IP Connections also imply the visibility of certain network
devices to him. For example, an attacker based in the internet may only have vision of a
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NATed enterprise network’s4 web server, since it is usually the only device publicly exposed
to the internet. By compromising devices in this network and pivoting through them an
attacker can gain vision of other devices. An attacker can have three different levels of
privileges on hosts in a network, namely no privileges, user level privileges or administrator
level privileges. An attacker who has no privileges on a target machine is not capable of
initiating an attack on another machine from the target, because he does not have sufficient
access levels to the target. An attacker with user level privileges on a target has the most
basic level of control, and can pivot through the machine to attack another target. An
attack who has administrator level privileges to a target has the highest level of access and
can initiate attacks on other targets as well as secure means of persistent access to the target,
by installing a backdoor on it. By exploiting vulnerabilities in products, an attacker can
compromise a host and escalate his privileges on it. This allows to him ’pivot’ through a
network, further compromising other hosts which he might not have had access to previously,
until a designated goal host is compromised. In this context, pivoting refers to a shift in an
attacker’s position by relocating to a compromised machine. For the purpose of this study,
a goal is strictly defined as a certain degree of privilege gained on a host compromised by an
attacker.
3.5.2 Modelling Exploit Actions
In graph domains, operators or actions are used to perform transitions between logical states.
Let us represent a deterministic transition system Σ = 〈 S, I, O, G〉 is used to encompass
all elements required for transitions between states. The transition system is deterministic
since there is only one initial state and all actions are deterministic. This implies that all
potential states of this networking environment are entirely predictable. The deterministic
transition system Σ is defined such that:
• S is a finite set of network states
• Initial network state I ∈ S
4Network Address Translation (NAT), described in simplified terms, is commonly used to hide an entire
subnet of private IP addresses behind a single public IP address. This is achieved by splitting a network
into an internal and external network, whereby a subnet of internal IP addresses are mapped to a single
externally accessible IP address. Communication is initiated from within the private network with outside
parties to establish the routing table for the external party to route packets to within the NATed network.
The result of this technique is that someone outside of the masqueraded network cannot access a private IP
directly without the private IP initiating communication first.
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• Exploit actions a ∈ O
• Goal network state set G ⊆ S is finite
Provided with an initial state s ∈ I and an exploit action a ∈ S such that a is applicable
to state s, a successor state s′ can be found. The successor state is defined within set S,
since the transition system is deterministic, and can be obtained using a transition function
γ with s′ = γ(s, a). Essentially, for a network state s to transition into a new state s′,
an exploit action must be able to take advantage of an existing vulnerability by satisfying
certain criteria. A plan P generated for a network is a critical attack path and is comprised of
a sequence π = a1,..., an of exploit actions. A plan P is valid iff for π there exists a sequence
of states s0,...,sn such that s0 = PInit and sn = PGoal. Below we define all of elements of an
exploit action used in transitioning network states.
Exploit Action Syntax
In the PDDL language an action is composed of three parts; a list of parameters, a precon-
dition and an effect. Using the Extended Backus-Naur Form (EBNF) description of PDDL
3.0[42], the syntax of an action is as follows:
(:action <action name>
:parameters <typed list of parameters>
:precondition <precondition propositions>
:effect <list of effects>
)
Below we examine an example of an exploit action based on vulnerability CVE-2009-0184,
defined for the domain of a network. Each exploit action is based on vulnerability information
extracted from NVD which is encoded into the PDDL syntax.
1. (:action CVE-2009-0184
2. :parameters (?attacker - host ?source - host ?target - host)
3. :precondition (
4. and (or (has_priv NO_PRIV ?target)(has_priv ALLOWS_USER_ACCESS ?target))
5. (compromised ?source)
6. (has_vuln ?target CVE-2009-0184)
7. (has_ip_connectivity ?source ?target)
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8. )
9. :effect (
10. and (has_priv ALLOWS_ADMIN_ACCESS ?target)
11. (compromised ?target)
12. (increase (cvss_total) 9.3)
13. )
14. )
The :parameters list is made up of a typed list of variables on which the action operates.
These variables are used in both the :precondition and :effect sections to modify the
defined domain for the problem space. Exploit actions use three parameters typed as host
objects; an attacker, a source device from where the attack is originating and a device being
targeted by the attacker.
Exploit Preconditions
A precondition is a first order logic which must be valid in the current state for an action to
be applicable to that current state[43]. Logical operators and, or and not can be applied to
atomic propositions defined in the predicate definitions, or a group of operators and atomic
propositions.
The domain defines three important predicates used in validating any exploit action; namely
(has ip connectivity ?source - host ?target - host), (compromised ?target - host)
and (has priv ?level - privilege ?target - host). The (has ip connectivity ?source
- host ?target - host) predicate is true if the source and target hosts are defined to have
IP connectivity in the problem specification. The (compromised ?target - host) predi-
cate returns true if the attacker has compromised the host in question. The privilege level
that an attacker has gained for a host is checked using the (has priv ?level - privilege
?target - host) predicate.
From action CVE-2009-0184, several atomic propositions are listed in :precondition,
based on defined predicates for the domain. The and operator in line 4 wraps around
the entire precondition and denotes that it is conjugated. In the first line the planner
evaluates whether the attacker has not got any privileges or has user level privileges on
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the target host. By checking this it prevents the action from being further evaluated if the
attacker already has the highest privilege level on the target, reducing processing time. Line
5 determines whether the source host has already been compromised by the attacker, since
to successfully compromise a target the attacker must already have pivoted his position to
the source host. Next the target host is examined to see whether it is in fact vulnerable
to CVE-2009-0184. In previous versions of NVA additional predicates were included for
product vendors, names and versions and compared with vulnerability information in the
domain to determine whether a host was vulnerable or not. However, it was found that
this method was too computationally expensive for the planner, leading to exhaustion of
memory for the simplest of networks. This lead to the refinement of techniques, performing
host vulnerability assessments as pre-processing, effectively taking a large computational
load off of the planner itself. Finally, line 7 checks whether there is in fact an IP connection
between the source and target hosts, since the attack cannot occurr if there is no link between
the two. If all statements listed in :precondition evaluate to true the preconditions for
the actions are satisfied and the postconditions can be applied.
Exploit Postconditions
Much like the precondition, the effect also uses first order logic together with the same no-
tation and operators. Atomic propositions can be set to true if they are not negated, while
negated atomic propositions are set to false in the resulting new state. The effect can also
act on numeric values which are defined as functions.
Functions act as tuples which associate values with domain objects, which can be modified
in :effects using primitive numeric expressions. Effects can modify a function value by
using direct assignment or increase and decrease operators. In the network domain, a
function defined as (cvss total) is used to keep track of the aggregated CVSS rating for
a sequence of exploit actions. This is important since this metric is used by the planner
to discover critical attack paths by identifying attack paths which yield the highest CVSS
rating. CVSS severity scores were selected as a means of guiding state-space exploration
since they are currently the only publicly available metric which can measure the impact of
an exploited vulnerability.
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In the :effect, the first line issues the assignment of a privilege that the attacker will
have on the target host. Line 11 sets the compromised predicate as true for the target
host. This predicate is used to prevent the planner’s search algorithm from backtracking
along previously explored paths. Lastly, the (cvss total) is increased by the value of the
vulnerability’s CVSS score, which in this case is 9.3. The combination of these statement
modifications yields a new domain state.
3.5.3 Deterministic Attack Planning
In deterministic planning two simple assumptions are made. Firstly, all actions are deter-
ministic which implies that an action can result in only one successor state. What this
means in terms of NVA is that the successful execution of an exploit action results in the
compromise of only one host device. Secondly, there can be only one initial state meaning
that the network can initially only have one state; a network of uncompromised host devices
which an attacker could potentially connect to.
Motivation for Using a Planner to Guide State-Space Searching
The most basic planning algorithm generates every possible state and then performs an
exhaustive search to find the shortest path from an initial state to a goal state. While
this technique may be practical for smaller state-spaces, it quickly becomes impractical
when the number of state variables is above 20 or 30[44]. Consider that for 20 boolean
state variables the state-space would be 220 = 1048576, while 30 boolean state variables
compute to 230 = 1073741824 states. Analysis on previous attack modelling approaches
proved to have exponential complexity due to the aforementioned problem. In an attempt
to address this issue, some approaches [45][46] used the assumption of monotonicity, whereby
a compromised host cannot be uncompromised. Fundamentally, this prevents back-tracking
through an attack graph during a state-space search, improving the problem from exponential
complexity to polynomial one[47]. This concept was employed in combination with the use
of a planner, in the design of NVA, to further reduce computation time. To avoid the state-
space explosion problem planners avoid generation of the entire state-space and rather focus
on only producing successor states to those under consideration. Selection of successor states
can be guided by using a heuristic approach to compute optimal solutions. Furthermore,
planners offer the following benefits:
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• Pruning of unnecessary actions and finds the shortest path to a goal state
• Allowance for the addition of actions to a plan at any time
• Use of a rich input language allows domains to described in detail
• Does not suffer from state-space explosion
Planners manage to achieve the aforementioned points by tackling state-space searching using
a more intelligent approach. They employ heuristics from artificial intelligence algorithms
which help by delaying or ruling out the exploration of unpromising regions of a graph. A
heuristic function h∗(s) is the cost of the true lowest-cost path from state s to a goal state.
Some heuristic function h is defined as admissible if:
h(s) ≤ h∗(s) ∀s ∈ S (3.1)
An admissible heuristic can be used to compute an optimal solution for a state-space. Dif-
ferent planners adopt different heuristic functions, affecting the amount of states generated
and the speed of solution discovery, encouraging further investigation into, and comparisons
of automated planners.
3.5.4 A Comparison of Automated Planners
After confirming the advantage that planners can provide in solving problems that require
the discovery of shortest paths, it was important to establish a suitable planner to use for the
network security domain. It is important to note that planners can be used interchangeably
since all modern planners use PDDL as a standardised method for representing domains and
problems.
The Fifth International Planning Competition (IPC-5)[48] acts as a benchmark for auto-
mated planners by evaluating different planning approaches. The competition is broken
down into two sections, a deterministic track and a non-deterministic track. Results from
the deterministic track were analysed given, the deterministic nature of this study, reveal-
ing strengths and weaknesses of several planners. Benchmark domains for the deterministic
track included a number domains, some of which were inspired by real world applications,
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and others by known problems in computer science. The domains or tracks studied were
storage, trucks, pathways, travelling purchaser problem and openstacks.
Travelling Purchaser Problem Domain
The travelling purchaser problem(TPP) is a well researched domain which is a general-
ized version of the Travelling Purchaser Problem. On this track there is a set of products
and a set of markets, where markets have limited product stocks at a known price. The
problem entails selecting a subset of markets such that the travel time and purchase cost is
minimized, while there is demand for each product. It is considered a challenging problem
since it is in fact NP-hard.
Figure 3.6: In the TPP track there are multiple depots and trucks, goods have uniform
prices and operators were added for loading and unloading goods to and from trucks[48].
Openstacks Domain
In openstacks, a manufacturer has a number of product orders for a variety of products.
Furthermore, the manufacturer can only make one product at a time, and the quantity of
each product is initialised at the same time. An order is said to be open from the creation of
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the first product of an order to the completion of all products in an order. While an order
is open created products are stored in a storage space known as a stack. The challenge is
to minimize the the maximum number of stacks being used simultaneously during an order
of different products, or minimize the number of orders made in simultaneous production.
This track simulates a realistic manufacturing problem and is also known to be NP-hard.
Figure 3.7: The objective function of this track is to minimize the maximum number of
simultaneously open stacks. Operators used perform simple functions including starting
orders, making products, shipping completed orders and stack opening action[48].
Storage Domain
This domain is involved in moving a certain number of crates from containers to depots,
using hoists. Hoists are governed by certain spatial reasoning and can move according to
certain mappings to connect areas of a depot. Problems generated for this domain aim at
creating different configurations based on different numbers of depots, crates, containers and
hoists.
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Figure 3.8: Domain operators for this track include lifting a crate with a hoist, dropping
a crate with the hoist, moving a hoist into a depot, moving a hoist from different areas
within a depot and moving a hoist outside of a depot.[48].
Trucks Domain
Trucks is concerned with logistical problems, whereby trucks with storage space limitations,
need to transport packages between various locations under certain constraints. Packages
need to be arranged in the storage area of a truck, keeping in mind that a package can only
be loaded into or unloaded from an area only if there is free space between the truck door
and the targeted area. A further restriction on this domain is a time constraint, used in
determining an optimal solution.
Pathways Domain
Inspired by molecular biology, pathways looks at constructing a sequence of chemical reac-
tions that generates one or more substances, limited by a certain number of input substances.
Duration times are assigned to reactions and the aim is to produce a valid plan in the mini-
mum amount of time.
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Figure 3.9: Four different operators are encoded into this track; loading a package into
a truck, unloading a package from a truck, moving a truck and delivering a package.
The objective function is to minimize the time taken to complete a problem as well as
the distance of the logistical problem[48].
Optimal and Suboptimal Tracks
Evaluation criteria is narrowed down further, splitting competing planners into two cate-
gories; optimal and suboptimal planners. Evaluation of planners in the optimal class looks
at the number of solved problems and the amount of CPU time taken. In the suboptimal
class the number of problems solved and plan quality is considered as the top priority, while
CPU time is considered as only a secondary measure. We focused on suboptimal planners
only, because the quality of plans as well as the number of solutions is of utmost importance
when determining the overall security of a modelled network. Although the computational
speed advantage offered by an optimal planner may processing of larger network models
faster, it may neglect to identify crucial aspects of information regarding attack vectors.
Summary of IPC-5 Suboptimal Track Results
In this section we evaluate the results for all planners competing in IPC-5’s suboptimal tracks,
focusing on the quality of plans and the number of valid solutions identified. Problems
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Figure 3.10: This track’s domain has five basic actions; an action to select an initial
substance, increasing the quantity of a substance, biochemical reactions, biochemical
reactions including catalysts and modelling biochemical synthesis reactions[48].
for each of the tracks were generated automatically by dedicated software tools for each
domain[48]. In each of the domains mentioned above, 30 different problems were tested on
each planner.
SGPlan5 placed first, with the best overall performance for the suboptimal tracks in IPC-
5[48]. The results from suboptimal tracks, displayed above, reflect that SGPlan5 was very
consistent at tackling each domain. For each track it managed to solve all 30 problems,
excepting for trucks where it solved 28 problems of the 30. Other distinguishing performers
which deserve mention include Downward04sa and Downward.IPC4, which were also fairly
consistent in completing the majority of the problems presented for suboptimal tracks. The
overall consistency and ability to manage both complex and simple problems, while producing
plans of optimal quality, made SGPlan5 the prime candidate for use in NVA.
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3.5.5 Further Insight into SGPlan5 and Subgoal Partition Plan-
ning
SGPlan5’s success in tackling large planning problems can be attributed to its problem
solving approach. SGPlan5 is capable of solving both temporal and non-temporal problems
and can understand problems written in both PDDL2 and PDDL3[49]. In temporal planning,
actions have durations meaning that the planner needs to take into account overlapping
actions as well as how far the execution of an actions has proceeded. On the other hand,
non-temporal planning does not take into account the duration of actions an only measures
the total time taken to compute a plan. Next we discuss the architecture of SGPlan5 and
the key processes involved in plan computation.
SGPlan5 Overview and Architecture
In this subsection we discuss SGPlan5’s architecture and describe the process used in subgoal
partition planning to reach a solution. The architecture of SGPlan5 is shown in Figure 3.11,
illustrating numerous steps used to reach a final plan.
Three main steps are used in solving a problem; namely parallel decomposition, con-
straint resolution and subproblem solving[50]. Below we further elaborate on these
steps and provide insight into how SGPlan5 goes about plan computation.
Parallel Decomposition: This step takes the initial problem and partitions the state-space
into subproblems which can be solved more easily. One of the results of this is that variables
of the problem are also partitioned into subsets, leading to the potential for variable subsets
of different subproblems to overlap. These overlapping variable subsets are referred to as
complicating variables, while variables in subsets which have no overlapping issues are known
as local variables. Two sets of attributes have been identified which lead to improved suc-
cess in partitioning problems; guidance variables and bottle-neck state variables. Guidance
variables are multi-valued state variables that are in goal-state constraints. Bottle-neck state
variables represent variables which restrict plan parallelisation, such as object mutexes which
prevent actions from accessing them simultaneously. Parallel decomposition is performed by
partitioning the problem, such that the number of partitions is the lower bound between the
number of guidance variables and bottle-neck state variables. A graph partitioning problem is
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Figure 3.11: SGPlan architecture[50].
created where guidance variables are clustered together, such that nodes represent guidance
variables and edges represent a constraint on both guidance variables.
Constraint Resolution: A further result of problem partitioning is the partitioning of
problem constraints into subsets. Similarly to variables, constraint subsets which involve
variables in one subset are called local constraints, while those using variables in other sub-
sets are defined as complicating constraints. Another step in solving problems is constraint
resolution, which is concerned with resolving the aforementioned complicating constraints.
Decomposition of problems and the partitioning of constraints into subsets can reduce the
complexity of problems, since the majority of planning domains have been observed to have
more local constraints than complicating constraints. Parallel decomposition results in mu-
tually excluded complicating constraints across subproblems, also known as violating con-
straints. These violating constraints are resolved using Extended Saddle Point Conditions,
transforming them into valid complicating constraints.
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Subproblem Solving: Once violating complicating constraints have been resolved, the
next step is to focus on solving each subproblem. Firstly, a function derived from each
subproblem’s objective function and complicating constraint functions are weighted with
penalty metrics to guide the search of each subproblem. Secondly, SGPlan5 uses a modified
version of Metric-FF as a basic planner to solve these subproblems individually, performing
multiple iterations. For each iteration the basic planner generates a valid solution which
satisfies the local constraints and minimizes the weighted violations complicating constraints.
After completing an iteration, penalty metrics are increased until all complicating constraints
are successfully resolved. The final plan for the original problem is built from solutions
computed for each of the subproblems.
3.5.6 Attack Planning Process
With and understanding of the techniques employed by SGPlan5 with subgoal partitioning,
we can look at how attack plans are computed for NVA. Attack planning draws on multiple
knowledge sources about a network as well as existing vulnerabilities from NVD. Before
the planning process can begin, this information needs to be translated into a format that
SGPlan5 can comprehend. The PDDL description language fills this role by acting as an
interface between network topological information and vulnerability information supplied to
NVD and the planner.
Generation of Attack Paths
We derive the planning problem P = (A, S, I, G) from the the definition for a Classical Plan-
ning Problem, to represent the network security problem, which aims to identify whether an
attacker can reach a target device as well as the most likely approach used to do so. In plan-
ning problem P , A is a set of exploit actions, S is a set of all state variables, I is the initial
network configuration or state that defines the original values for all state variables and G
the goal or target device of the attack. Since S is not explicitly defined and constructed by
NVA itself, we will focus on further describing the triple (A, I, G).
The set of all exploit actions A is used in constructing the domain for the network security
problem P . As described in Section 3.5.2, exploit actions are constructed using information
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based on vulnerability information stored in the NVD database.
An initial state I acts as a starting point for SGPlan5 to use in computing a plan. In
essence, I describes the initial configuration of the network in a PDDL problem file, based
on network topological information provided as input to NVA. To further illustrate the types
of information encoded in I, an extract of a problem file is provided below:
1. (:objects
2.
3. ;ID01 Host machines
4. Attacker - host
5. Workstation1 - host
6. Workstation2 - host
7. Workstation3 - host
8. Web_Server - host
9.
10. ;ID02 Vulnerability names
11. CVE-2009-0184 - vulnerability
12. CVE-2008-2551 - vulnerability
13. CVE-2008-0082 - vulnerability
14. )
15.
16. (:init [Defined as I in P=(A,S,I,G)]
17.
18. ;ID03 Define IP connectivity relations
19. (has_ip_connectivity Attacker Web_Server)
20. (has_ip_connectivity Workstation1 Web_Server)
21. (has_ip_connectivity Workstation1 Workstation2)
22. (has_ip_connectivity Workstation1 Workstation3)
23. (has_ip_connectivity Workstation1 Web_Server)
24.
25. ;ID04 Define privilege relations
26. (has_priv ALLOWS_ADMIN_ACCESS Attacker)
27. (has_priv NO_PRIV Workstation1)
28. (has_priv NO_PRIV Workstation2)
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29. (has_priv NO_PRIV Workstation3)
30. (has_priv NO_PRIV Web_Server)
31.
32. ;ID05 Define vulnerabilities on hosts
33. (has_vuln Workstation1 CVE-2009-0184)
34. (has_vuln Workstation2 CVE-2008-2551)
35. (has_vuln Web_Server CVE-2008-0082)
36. )
37.
38. ;Define metrics
39. (:metric
40. maximize (cvss_total)
41. )
42.
43. ;ID06 Define goal [Defined as G in P=(A,S,I,G)]
44. (:goal
45. (and(has_priv ALLOWS_ADMIN_ACCESS Workstation1)))
46. )
In the above extract we can see two sections containing information about the initial net-
work configuration I ; namely the objects, init, metric and goal sections. The objects
section is used to define any object variables for the planning problem. In this case it is a
list of all the hosts in the network as well as all the vulnerabilities discovered during the
vulnerability assessment phase. Similarly to other object oriented languages, PDDL allows
the declaration of object types. This is achieved by adding the :typing requirements to the
requirement sections at the top of both the domain and problem files. The benefit :typing
provides is that objects of invalid type parsed to actions are dismissed and not considered in
the computation of valid solutions, eliminating irrelevant calculations. In the init section,
predicates are initialised using information extracted from the network configuration file.
Predicates that need to be defined include the IP connectivity relations between network
devices, the initial type of privilege level that the attacker has to all specified devices, and
finally enumerating existing vulnerabilities on network devices. In NVA the user is presented
with a graphic view of the network which allows the specification of a goal G. A goal state
is the compromise of a specified host, resulting in the attacker gaining a particular privilege
level to that host. This is detailed between lines 43 and 45, where within the goal sec-
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tion the has priv predicate defines a goal state. In the above extract we see that the goal
is in fact for the attacker to compromise Workstation1 and gain administrator privileges to it.
A plan P can be arrived at for problem P , outlining the shortest path identified from initial
state I to goal state G. Each node in a plan is comprised of a triplet (E, S, T ), where E is
an exploit action, S is the source host from which the attack originates for the current step
and T is the target host. However, this plan may not be the best solution to the problem
since other plans may exist which may be more damaging to the network’s security as a
whole. This prompts the introduction of a metric function to guide the search for a plan
based on CVSS severity scores, consequently discovering the most dangerous attack path to
reach a target. A metric is defined in the :metric section, where a maximization function
is applied to a numerical variable called cvss total. This variable is modified as the result
of successful execution of an exploit action, increasing cvss total by the CVSS score of the
vulnerability exploited. The framework relies on SGPlan5’s ability to search efficiently for
an optimal attack path, which can be used for analysis.
The Evolution of States During an Attack
A state is defined as a set of atoms or facts pertaining to the configuration of a network
at a specific point in time. This set of facts is an accumulation of information for all of
the devices in the network, including host names, vulnerabilities on hosts, IP connectivity
relationships and whether a host has been compromised, as well as the privilege level gained
by the attacker. These atomic facts, which are either true or false, affect the kinds of
actions that are applicable to a state. A state-transition is the evolution of a state’s facts
from the current configuration to a new configuration via the modification of facts. State-
transitions can take place when all expressions in the preconditions for a particular exploit
action are satisfied. The satisfaction of preconditions allows yields in the execution of a set of
expressions in the postconditions. When an exploit action is successfully executed the target
machine is marked as compromised and the attacker gains access to it with the privilege
level associated with the vulnerability. This results in a modification of the network’s facts
which in turn changes the access that the attacker has to the network. In Figure 3.12 we
can see the effects of several state-transitions of a network model.
During an attack on a network, an attacker may initially have restricted access to devices in
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Figure 3.12: The evolution of an attack on a network using state-transitions.
the network, as well as a limited view of the network due to devices being concealed within
various subnets by routers, firewalls or switches. However, by “pivoting” from one host to
another by gaining access privileges to other hosts the attacker is able to improve his stance
by not only increasing network visibility, but also expanding his potential to connect to
other hosts via newly compromised hosts. Figure 3.12 illustrates the evolution of an attack
with each state-transition, showing how the attacker can effectively develop his position and
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perspective. Much like a game of chess, newly attained positions within a network offer the
attacker an improved chance of reaching their final target.
3.6 Attack Plan Analysis Techniques - Layer II
The aforementioned approach in Section 3.5.6 has the potential to produce a plan known as
a critical attack path, should it exist, which acts as a conduit for an attacker to reach a tar-
get. When analysing the results of an critical attack path, one must consider the perspective
of a network administrator or security specialist who is attempting to harden the network
in question. While a critical attack path provides insight into the most likely route of an
attack, it does not answer the question, “How do I prevent this attack from happening?”
The two analysis algorithms aim to address this question by presenting the user with the
most prudent solution in terms of threat impact and asset damage minimization.
Figure 3.13: Analysis of attack plans is performed by evaluating modifications of the
initial network.
In Figure 3.13 we illustrate the process used in performing both Critical Action Analysis and
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Asset Action Analysis within NVA. The Attack Analysis Module houses all the algorithms
involved in both analysing generated critical attack paths and identifying optimal solutions.
Both the Attack Graph Constructor and Planner play key roles in analysis and are relied on
heavily in this iterative process. These two analysis techniques aim to identify a node from
a critical attack path, which when removed, completely break up the graph and prevent an
attacker entirely from reaching the target. Following the aforementioned Attack Planning
Process, a graph is constructed from the critical attack path which is presented to the user
visually in the NVA GUI. We further describe the analysis process performed after a graph
is generated:
1. The Attack Analysis Module uses this graph to create several clones of the original
network model, denoted as Ni. These clones act as separate network cases associated
with each node in the critical attack path.
2. For each Ni, the corresponding node is removed from the network, essentially removing
the vulnerability from the exploited host.
3. Each network Ni is sent to the Attack Graph Constructor which attempts to generate
a new critical attack path to the same target host. A candidate solution has been
identified if no path can be generated, since the removal of the graph node from network
Ni prevented the attack from occurring.
4. The Attack Analysis Module stores a list of all of the candidate solutions identified,
which are then arranged based on the type of analysis technique being used.
The two analysis techniques available will be further elaborated on, comparing the types of
sorting algorithms used on candidate solutions as well as highlighting the benefits of each
method.
3.6.1 Critical Action Analysis
Once a list of candidate solutions have been identified, this algorithm proceeds by ranking
each solution according to their position within the critical attack path. Once solution
nodes have been ranked and sorted, the node with the lowest ranking (earliest in the graph)
is selected as the final solution. The aim of this is to halt the attack by preventing the
attack from progressing as soon as possible. Thus, it eliminates the potential for the attack
to penetrate any deeper into the network.
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3.6.2 Asset Action Analysis
This algorithm behaves similarly to Critical Action Analysis, also aiming to identify a so-
lution which prevents an attack from occurring. However, it differs in that rather than
focusing on identifying a solution node which causes the largest break in the graph, it takes
into account the asset values of hosts. Subsequently, solution nodes are ranked according to
the value of the asset affected by an exploit action. The reason for considering this analysis
technique is when one wants to, at all costs, secure the most valuable devices whose down-
time would greatly affect the productivity of an organization. It should be noted that in
both Critical Action Analysis and Asset Action Analysis, the first node is ignored. The first
node represents the point of entry and device initially compromised.
While it is typically most prudent to eliminate the point of origin of the attack to prevent it
from progressing, this would make it impossible to generate attack paths. As such, the first
node in an attack path is removed from the list of analysed nodes to aid in graph exploration
and discovery of an optimal solution. In a scenario whereby the attacker is based externally
and is required to breach perimeter security devices in order to gain access, it would best
practice to secure these devices. However, from an internal perspective it may not be feasible
to patch every workstation from which an attack may originate. Thus, it is important to
take into account the resolution of other vulnerabilities which prevent the compromise of
mission critical devices.
3.6.3 Criteria for Success
The criteria for success is governed by the ability for NVA to accurately discover attack paths
which yield the highest severity scores. In the context of NVA, these paths are known as
critical attack paths and denote the most likely attack vector, used to compromise a targeted
device in the network being assessed. Moreover, the criteria for success is also dictated by the
solution’s ability to correctly select nodes from critical attack paths, which when patched,
eliminate the potential for compromise on the targeted device.
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3.7 Visualization Design - Layer III
The visualization aspect of NVA was designed to be simple yet robust, providing the user
with several interactive graph views. The Visualization layer was decoupled from the rest
of the framework’s core, ensuring that any GUI related processing does not interfere with
any Layer II activities. NVA performs some memory and process intensive computations
while simultaneously providing feedback in the form of visual graphs. Extensive usage of
worker threads were made in order to prevent the GUI from becoming unresponsive, during
computation intensive periods. This approach assigns all Attack Graph Computation
layer activities to a background worker thread, while assigning all Visualization layer activ-
ities to a foreground thread.
Synchronous communication between layers was chosen to better support the potentially
high system overhead. Furthermore, the order in which certain method calls are performed
needs to be guaranteed, since other methods may be heavily reliant on generated artefacts.
Communication between Layer II and Layer III was designed to be achieved using direct
method calls which exchange data objects.
3.8 Chapter Summary
This chapter highlighted elements of NVA’s design, breaking down the computation of critical
attack paths into three well-defined layers. In the first layer, we described two information
sources which are fundamental in constructing network models; namely network topology
and configuration input, and a vulnerability database. The second layer covered the core
aspects of NVA, elaborating on the transformation of information from the first layer into
plannable models. Attack planning was described, highlighting the role of a planner in
computing critical attack paths, based on predefined models. It was also shown how these
critical attack paths could be analysed to produce meaningful solutions for those conducting a
security evaluation of a network. Finally, in the third layer the approach used for visualization
was described, elaborating on the decouplement of the visualization from logic. In this next
chapter we will outline the implementation of NVA and showcase algorithms used in the
attack path computation and solution identification.
76
Chapter 4
Implementation
This chapter describes the implementation of NVA, based on the design proposed in the
previous chapter. We outline the algorithms used for network generation, network informa-
tion and vulnerability extraction, and attack plan analysis. Moreover, the implementation of
NVA’s graphical user interface is elaborated on, illustrating the core functionality offered to
users.
4.1 Overview
In this chapter we present the implementation of NVA, whose purpose is to demonstrate
the validity and usefulness to threat modelling. NVA is a proof-of-concept (PoC) framework
which utilizes an existing vulnerability database to model threats against hosts in a network.
The PoC extracts vulnerability information from the vulnerability database, transforming
them into atomic exploit actions which a planner can use to test against a network model.
Two analysis techniques have been implemented to further support the user in making an
informed decision as to which hosts need to be patched. A network generation procedure
was also implemented to assist in evaluation, during NVA’s design process.
The implementation of the proposed design was done using a combination of Planning Do-
main Definition Language (PDDL)[19] and Java.1 PDDL is a language is a common formal-
1http://www.java.com
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ism used for describing planning domains, and is the most widely used language for planners.
On the other hand, Java is an object-oriented language which can operate across different
platforms. This is highly beneficial since writing an application in Java isolates it from plat-
form dependent aspects of the system on which it is deployed. Other benefits include the
ability to represent model elements as objects, multi-processing using threads, automatic
garbage collection and the abundance of available libraries for building user interfaces and
XML document parsing.
4.2 Generation of Networks for Simulation
During earlier stages of development, manual construction of small sample networks could
be done within an acceptable amount of time. However, generation of larger networks proved
challenging to perform manually, due to the interconnected nature of network models. One
of the objectives of NVA is to prove that analysis can be performed on large networks,
prompting investigation into network generation techniques. Simplistic network configura-
tion requirements lead to creation of a custom network generation engine rather than relying
on more cumbersome network simulators, such as NS-32 and OMNeT++3.
The network generator constructs networks which adhere to the campus network architec-
ture. That is, a collection of subnetworks connected by switches and routers to form a larger
network. Large organizations make use of campus network architecture because its modular
design makes networks highly scalable, flexible and administrable. Networks are generated
by creating clusters of workstations and servers within subnets, connected with the rest of
the network using switches and routers.
4.2.1 Network Generation Procedure
In Algorithm 1, the generation procedure has been annotated, revealing several distinct
routines. Its main routine is concerned with generating a number of switches, specified using
2NS-3 is a tool used for network simulation, primarily geared towards research and educational use. Its
infrastructure allows the simulation of realistic network models which can operate at real-time and interact
with real-world protocols[51].
3OMNeT++ is designed to simulate communication networks, but can also be used to simulate IT systems
or hardware architecture[52].
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the parameter s. Every network is required to have a router, allowing communication with
other networks or the internet. Switch generation is further subdivided into segments which
govern the generation of workstations and servers, ensuring that each switch acts as a parent
node to a number of hosts in a subnet. A random integer n, between one and five, is used as
an upper bound for the amount of servers or workstations to create and add to a subnet. Not
shown in Algorithm 1, is the generation of individual hosts, which entails the possible random
selection of products from NVD. In doing this, it ensures that some hosts have vulnerable
products installed which could potentially be exploited by the attacker. Next, the newly
populated network is parsed to a function, shown in line 32, which generates IP connectivity
relations between randomly selected hosts. The connection generation function ensures that
all hosts within a subnet have connectivity with each other, since it is uncommon for a switch
to be configured to restrict connectivity between hosts in its subnet. Next, the attacker’s
host is added to the network and is connected to a random number of hosts, based on the
network size. Finally, the fully populated network is returned and is ready to be written to
a file.
This feature has been integrated into NVA to aide in research and testing. Shown in Figure
4.1, is the wizard presented to the user to help construct a new network.
Figure 4.1: The network generation wizard simplifies the construction of networks by
requesting only essential information required.
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Algorithm 1 Generation Procedure for Sample Networks
1: procedure Network Generator(s)
2: switchCount← s
3: function Generate Hosts(switchCount)
4: Add router to network
5: if switchCount > 2 then
6: Add centralSwitch to network
7: end if
8: for i← 0, switchCount do . Add switches to network
9: Create switch
10: if switchCount ≤ 2 then
11: Set router as parent
12: else
13: Set centralSwitch as parent
14: end if
15: Add switch to network
16: n← Random Number Generator(1, 5)
17: for j ← 0, n do . Add server host to subnet
18: Create server
19: Add Products(server)
20: Add server to network
21: Set switch as parent
22: end for
23: n← Random Number Generator(1, 5)
24: for j ← 0, n do . Add workstation host to subnet
25: Create workstation
26: Add Products(workstation)
27: Add workstation to network
28: Set switch as parent
29: end for
30: end for
31: end function
32: Generate Host Connections(network)
33: Generate Attacker(network)
34: return network
35: end procedure
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The wizard follows a simple 3-step process which allows the user to select NVD files with
which the generator selects products, a file to save the network as and the desired amount of
switches in the network. This NVA feature was used throughout the evaluation phase and
drastically helped the speed at which networks of varied size could be built for testing. It
has the capability of generating small networks with just one switch or extensive networks
with tens or hundreds of switches.
4.3 Vulnerability Extraction from NVD
Upon first usage, the user is presented with the option to select a directory containing NVD
vulnerability files. This location is written to NVA’s configuration file and can be altered
by the user at any time. In the Design Chapter we detailed the structure of entries in NVD
and also outlined which were necessary to build exploit actions. Further investigation was
conducted to identify an optimal technique for parsing large XML files within a reasonable
time frame.
4.3.1 A Comparison of XML Parsers
Considering that NVA was written in Java, the two most popular Java XML parsers were
compared; SAX (Simple API for XML Parsing) and DOM (Document Object Model) Parser.
Both parsers have there own set of advantage and disadvantages which will be further elab-
orated on below.
• DOM Parser converts XML documents into tree models, having elements represent
branches of the tree. The entire document is converted into a tree which is stored
in memory.
• SAX Parser works by using events triggered by elements in XML documents. When
an opening element of a tag is encountered, an event fires to begin the parsing
process of the contained data. SAX Parser parses XML documents in sections
and does not load the entire document into memory.
There are several differences in the way each parser functions, which affect how suitable they
are at parsing NVD files. In Table 4.1, we provide a comparison, highlighting some of the
pros and cons of each parser.
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Table 4.1 A high-level comparison between SAX and DOM Parser[53].
SAX DOM
Memory Consumption Low - Only small parts of a doc-
ument is loaded into memory.
High - The entire document is
loaded into memory.
Access Speed Slow - Access speed is limited by
the time taken to read the docu-
ment in.
Fast - DOM can access a file
quickly in memory.
Optimal File Size Large - SAX does not require
much memory so it can read large
documents easily.
Smaller - Small files can be parsed
and accessed very quickly.
When comparing the differences between these two parsers it was important to consider
the large size of NVD files. SAX Parser was selected for this reason and was implemented
in the process responsible domain transformation. This information is later used in the
construction of domain files, tailored to each specific network.
4.4 Network Configuration Information Extraction
Network configuration information is stored in an XML file, in a tree-like structure which
links hosts to a network. Information extracted from this file is structured into a network
object, containing each of the hosts. A network object is later used in the construction of
a problem description file for the planner. SAX Parser was implemented for the network
configuration extraction process and functions similarly to the algorithm used to extract
vulnerabilities from NVD.
4.4.1 Network Configuration Extraction Procedure
The extraction procedure reads the XML file in steps, using the SAX Parser. Algorithm 2
breaks the procedure down into two key functions which also highlight SAX Parser’s event-
triggered approach. The first function, named Start Element, is triggered whenever a start
element is read from a line by SAX Parser. It then proceeds to identify and match the
element and contained data with the appropriate host variable. It is important to note that
HOSTNAME or PRODUCT elements do not contain single data entries, but rather a series
of subelements. When one of these elements are triggered in Start Element, a new host or
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product object is created, to which extracted data can be assigned. The second function,
named End Element, finalizes the parsing process for a set of elements and is responsible for
linking product objects to host objects, and host objects to a network.
4.5 Transformation of Models into PDDL
In order to compute critical attack paths, the planner must be provided with information
about the scenario and its environment. The scenario is described in the problem PDDL,
while the environment is described in the domain PDDL. The planner relies on both of these
files, which need to be constructed based on existing models created by NVA.
4.5.1 Constructing the Problem Description
The problem is derived from the network model, which was established from the network
configuration file provided as input to NVA. Moreover, the goal is specified as the target
of attack, selected by the user via NVA’s network graph GUI. A problem template was
created, which includes the necessary constructs of every problem file, as well as markers
which indicate code-injection points for NVA to write model information to. These markers
guide NVA to write the following model information:
• Hosts
• Vulnerability names
• IP connectivity relations
• Attacker privileges on hosts
• Vulnerabilities associated with specific hosts
• Attack goal
Essentially, the problem file is a way of specifying the initial state I and goal state G for the
planning problem P = (A, I, G).
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Algorithm 2 Network Configuration Extraction Procedure
1: procedure Problem Parser(networkF ile, network)
2: SAXParser(networkF ile)
3: function Start Element(SAXParser)
4: startElement← SAXParser.start
5: lineData← SAXParser.data
6: if startElement = HOST then . Instantiate a new host
7: Create host
8: else if startElement = HOSTNAME then
9: host.name← lineData
10: else if startElement = HOSTIP then
11: host.ip← lineData
12: else if startElement = IPCONNECTIV ITY then
13: host.connectivityList← lineData
14: else if startElement = DEV ICETY PE then
15: host.type← lineData
16: else if startElement = ASSETV ALUE then
17: host.value← lineData
18: else if startElement = PRODUCT then . Instantiate a new product
19: Create product
20: else if startElement = PRODUCTV ENDOR then
21: product.vendor ← lineData
22: else if startElement = PRODUCTNAME then
23: product.name← lineData
24: else if startElement = PRODUCTV ERSION then
25: product.version← lineData
26: end if
27: end function
28: function End Element(SAXParser)
29: endElement← SAXParser.end
30: if endElement = HOST then
31: Add host to network
32: else if endElement = PRODUCT then
33: Add product to host
34: end if
35: end function
36: return network
37: end procedure
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4.5.2 Constructing the Domain Description
The domain is the result of transforming vulnerabilities into exploit models, pertaining
to a particular network problem. As mentioned previously, it is not practical to model
every vulnerability into exploits because it slows down plan computation. A palette of
vulnerabilities are modelled into exploits, based on a vulnerability scan of host products.
The following information is converted from exploit models in NVA to PDDL actions:
• Initial attacker privilege level on the target
• Whether the source host has been compromised
• Whether the target is affected by the vulnerability
• Whether there is an IP connectivity relation between the source and target
• The resulting attacker privilege level on the target
• Compromise of the target
• Modifying the aggregated CVSS severity of the attack path
The aforementioned items are encoded into PDDL predicates which can be processed by
SGPlan5. Similarly to writing the problem file, the domain file template is marked with a
code-injection point which directs NVA to the correction position to write actions to. The
combination of the problem and domain files are parsed to SGPlan5 as input parameters.
NVA executes SGPlan5 in a background thread and waits for the results to be generated in
a plan output file. The content of this file is ’scraped out’ by NVA to see whether a valid
plan was identified, parsing the result into an attack plan object, should it exist.
4.6 Attack Plan Analysis
Both attack plan analysis techniques offered in NVA aim to identify a host-vulnerability
combination, which when patched, completely prevents an attacker from being able to com-
promise a target. Moreover, both techniques utilize the same base procedure, shown in
Algorithm 3, to arrive at a list of candidate solutions.
In Algorithm 3 we see how a clone network is made for each critical attack path node. A
node is symbolic of a host-vulnerability combination, identifying an exploited vulnerability
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Algorithm 3 Attack Analysis Procedure
1: procedure Compute Solution(network, attackPath, switch)
2: pathSize← attackPath.size
3: for i← 1, pathSize do
4: node← attackPath[i]
5: cloneNetwork ← Network Cloner(network, node)
6: cloneAttackPath← Attack Graph Constructor(cloneNetwork)
7: Add node to vulnerabilityList
8: Add cloneNetwork to networkList
9: end for
10: solutionList← Find Solution Action(vulnerabilityList, networkList)
11: Sort Solutions(solutionList, attackPath)
12: if switch = 0 then
13: Filter Solutions(solutionList, attackPath)
14: else
15: Filter Solutions By Asset(solutionList, attackPath)
16: end if
17: return solutionList
18: end procedure
on a particular host, from the critical attack path. This node is removed from the cloned
network, essentially patching the vulnerable device. By treating each cloned network as a
new test case we can determine whether the modification in fact prevents the attack from
being successfully carried out. The algorithm branches into either Critical Action Analysis
or Asset Value Analysis, based on a switch parameter. These two algorithms use contrasting
methods for filtering candidate solutions, based on differing priorities.
4.6.1 Critical Action Analysis
Although each candidate solution discovered in Algorithm 3 would prevent the attacker from
reaching their target, they have different implications on the amount of damage an attacker
could still cause. An attacker which can penetrate deeper into a network can potentially
inflict more damage on a company. Each host in an attack path could have sensitive data
compromised or corrupted, or even be rendered unavailable. By using Critical Action Anal-
ysis the attack is thwarted as early as possible to minimize damage impacted on the network.
Algorithm 4 identifies an optimal solution by taking the list of candidate solutions and
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ranking each of them based on their position in the originally identified critical attack path.
This means that a candidate solution which is earlier in the critical attack path will have
a lower rank than one which is later. The solution list is pruned by eliminating all other
solutions which have a higher rank than the optimal solution.
Algorithm 4 Action Analysis Procedure
1: procedure Filter Solutions(solutionList, attackPath)
2: if solutionList is Empty then
3: return
4: else
5: solutionsSize← solutionList.size
6: solution← solutionList[0]
7: bestRank ← index of solution in attackPath
8: for i← 1, solutionsSize do
9: solution← solutionList[i]
10: rank ← index of solution in attackPath
11: if rank > bestRank then
12: Remove solution from solutionList
13: end if
14: end for
15: end if
16: end procedure
4.6.2 Asset Value Analysis
Asset Value Analysis considers the asset values of hosts the top priority when identifying an
optimal solution. This technique is aimed at securing high priority hosts, whose downtime
would negatively affect an organization’s ability to function. The algorithm addresses this
issue by sorting the list of candidate solutions by asset value. A solution whose host has a
lower asset value than the optimal solution is removed from the solution list, resulting in top
priority solution candidates.
4.7 Graph Visualization and User Interface
NVA’s interface is divided up into a number of sections, with the main focal point being the
network graph itself. Appendix B shows a screenshot taken from NVA of a simple network,
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illustrating the various sections presented to the user. Along the main menu, we provide a
number of functions, listed and elaborated on further below:
1. Open a network topology file. NVA can only read XML network configuration files
which adhere to NVA’s file format.
2. Generate Attack Path transforms the network model into a PDDL model, using a
user-specified target to compute a critical attack path.
3. Network Scan uses the same process as in the generation of a single critical attack
path, however considers every host in the network as an attacker’s target. The outcome
of this highlights each host’s security level from the attacker’s perspective.
4. Critical Action Analysis becomes available only after a critical attack path has been
discovered and aims to provider the user with a solution to the attack by suggesting
the most optimal software to patch on a host.
5. Asset Action Analysis Functions much like Critical Action Analysis excepting
that it prioritizes hosts with higher asset values.
6. Zoom In increases the size of the graphic displayed.
7. Zoom Out decreases the size of the graphic displayed.
8. Snapshot allows the user to take a screenshot of the graphic being displayed so that
it can be saved.
The left-most panel houses the Properties and Device Connection List windows. When a
user selects a device from the graph it displays all of the information pertaining to that de-
vice in the Properties window, including its host name, IP address, device type, asset value
and the products installed on it. Moreover, the selection of a product, should it have an
existing vulnerability, displays its CVSS information.
The network graphic illustrates the hierarchical structure of the network but neglects to
reveal the connectivity relations between devices. The reason for omitting this information
is mainly because it tends to clutter up the network graphic, making it difficult to interact
with it, especially in larger networks. To address this issue, the Device Connection List
window was introduced to the interface, containing a tree structure indicating a network’s
underlying connectivity relations.
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The center-most pane houses the network graph and all generated critical attack paths.
Earlier version of NVA used custom-created canvases to paint graphs onto, however a more
extensive graphing framework was discovered. Java Universal Network Graph(JUNG)[54] is
a free open-source software library which allows the visualization and modification of graphs
in Java. The ease of use and multitude of functionality offered by this library motivated its
selection, one of which being the ability to cluster several nodes around a central node in a
wagon wheel configuration. This configuration suitably represents the clustering of several
hosts around devices such as switches or routers, commonly used in computer network dia-
grams.
Below the graphing area a contextual window offers details to the user about the current
graphic pane being viewed. In the network view it enumerates information about the total
number of devices in the network, a break down of these devices into their device types
and also the number of vulnerabilities discovered in the entire network, as a result of the
automated vulnerability scan. In the attack view it lists information about the critical attack
path discovered as well as its total severity score.
4.8 Chapter Summary
The implementation of the proof of concept framework, presented in this chapter, was di-
vided into six sections. These sections highlight fundamental procedures required to model
threats and identify solutions to these threats. Java was used to implement the framework
because it is object-oriented, manages garbage collection, is platform independent and has
an abundance of libraries both required for XML document parsing and graphing on the
GUI. PDDL was used to model network domain information since it is the most modern
and standardised language used by automated planners. The following chapter will discuss
evaluation methods and demonstrate the usage of NVA in two realistic scenarios.
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Evaluation
In this chapter we will evaluate the effectiveness of NVA by subjecting it to two different kinds
of evaluation methods. Firstly, the basic functionality and versatility will be demonstrated
with in-depth walkthroughs of two different case studies. The aims of these two case studies
are to reflect the application of NVA in a variety of scenarios featuring different types of
networks. Moreover, NVA will use identified threats to try and identify the most beneficial
solution for each type of scenario. Secondly, the performance and scalability of NVA will be
analysed to determine whether the framework scales well for large networks.
5.1 Case Study Demonstration
5.1.1 Case Study 1
This case focuses on a small scale network and acts as a simple proof of concept demonstration
for NVA. The simplicity of this case aims to demonstrate how a sequence of actions can be
identified which could lead to the compromise of critical network resources.
Network Topology
The example network illustrated in Figure 5.1 shows a network likely to be installed in
a small organization. This case study models a small school network and shows how an
attacker can target internal network resources from the internet. The devices this small
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network contains include workstations, servers, switches, routers and firewalls. The network
infrastructure is broken up into three different subnets, two of which contains workstations
and the other a cluster of servers. Subnet 1 is situated inside a computer lab and is used
by school students only. The student lab contains basic workstations which offer students
access to basic document editing software and internet, accessed via the web server, to help
them in doing research for assignments. Student workstations are not permitted to access
the file server nor database server, since the information they contain is sensitive. Subnet 2 is
situated inside a staff computer lab and is restricted to use by school teachers. Workstations
in Subnet 2 are used by teachers to perform various administrative functions, including
accessing and editing student information in the database server, as well as storing test and
exam papers on the file server. Subnet 3 is comprised of a small cluster of servers, including a
File Server, Web Server and Database Server. The Web Server is responsible for hosting the
school website and acting as a web proxy for all workstations in the internal network to access
the internet. The File Server is used by staff members for storing test and exam papers and
preliminary student mark information before being finalised and committed to the database.
Lastly, the Database Server contains detailed student records with information such as their
finalised quarterly marks, financial records and workstation usernames and passwords for
both students and staff members. Firewalls are used to filter traffic between subnets within
the network and also restrict access to the internal network from public networks such as the
internet. Note that for these firewall configurations are a simplification of the ingress and
egress filtering performed on firewalls in reality, and as such the actual port filtering rules are
not provided. This simplification is deemed as acceptable considering that the overall effect,
in terms of connectivity relations, is what is being used to perform attack path generation.
Firewalls FW1 and FW2 restrict network traffic as follows:
• FW1: Allows external access from the internet to the Web Server
• FW2: Allows access to the Web Server from both Subnet 1 and Subnet 2 and only
allows access to the File Server and Database Server from Subnet 2.
Network Device Configuration Information
Devices in the network may contain a number of vulnerable products installed on them,
each of them offering different kinds of benefits to the intruder. A detailed outline of the
products installed on several devices in the network is provided in Appendix A, including
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Figure 5.1: A network structure inspired by a small school network.
a vulnerability identifier, description, access vector required for exploitation, CVSS severity
rating and the privilege level gained from successful exploitation.
Scenario Description
In this scenario, the attacker is a school student named Bob seeking to get hold of exam
papers in order to sell them to other students. Bob is based outside of the school network
and only has access to the Web Server. From this perspective Bob would use a network
scanner, such as NMAP[40] to discover the version of the web service running on the Web
Server, in order to select an applicable exploit to increase is privilege level. A common tool in
the attacker’s arsenal, NMAP performs TCP and UDP scans to discover services running on
a target host. Moreover, upon completion it can probe discovered ports to determine what
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exactly is running, including service names and version numbers, both valuable information
in formulating an attack vector. While firewall FW1 is installed to prevent unwanted access
to the internal network, it fails to prevent this since it allows traffic to reach the Web Server.
The Web Server, running Microsoft IIS 7.5, is vulnerable to a remote privilege escalation
exploit granting Bob root or administrative access to it. By gaining access to an internal
device of the school network, Bob now has the ability to pivot from the Web Server into
another attack on several other devices he now has connectivity with from his new position.
While the workstations Bob now has vision of may be an option to launch a new attack
against from his newly attained vantage point, the offer little value to him in terms of the
information they may contain. The primary target of his multi-step attack is the File Server,
which contains the exam papers along with other sensitive information. However, the Web
Server does not have access to the File Server initially, prompting Bob to investigate other
means of attack which could improve his stance in attaining his goal. From the perspective
of a network administrator, it is crucial to prevent the compromise of such high value assets,
such as the File Server and Database Server in this scenario. NVA helps to identify critical
paths leading to the compromise of specific targets, allowing the network administrator to
take the appropriate actions to solve the problem.
NVA Usage Walkthrough
In order to discover if any attack paths exist between the attacker and the File Server,
the administrator uses NVA to analyse the network. The administrator opens the network
configuration up in NVA and selects the File Server as its target. It is assumed that Bob
will aim to gain root privileges to the File Server so that he can install a backdoor to allow
for easier means of access in the future. The File Server is selected as a root target, as
illustrated in Figure 5.2, and an attack graph is attempted to be generated by clicking the
button shown in Figure 5.3. The selected target is not as merely being able to connect to
the File Server but rather as a system state. This state is defined as the attacker having
successfully compromised the File Server and attaining root privileges on it. Note the round
green icon on the right of the NVA main menu, indicating that not attack graphs have been
identified currently. Should an attack graph be identified, this icon changes to red to indicate
that the target is in danger of being exploited.
The planner is not always capable of producing an attack path to a target device. A plan
or attack path can only be generated if there exists an sequence of atomic actions(exploits)
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Figure 5.2: A host is selected as a target for attack. NVA will try to find a critical
attack path which results in the attacker obtaining root privileges to the target.
Figure 5.3: The model is sent to the planner to be processed and returns an optimal
attack graph to a target devices, should it exist.
which can transition the attacker from one state to another through out the network. In
a network security model, state-transitions correspond with an attacker gaining access to
various devices and elevating his privilege levels until he reaches a goal device. However, in
this scenario NVA was able to produce an attack path reaching the File Server, illustrating
how Bob could pivot through a combination of workstations and servers to reach his goal.
In the Network View, we can now see that all devices involved in this attack have turned
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red to outline critical devices which need to be addressed by the administrator. By selecting
the Attack Graph Tab we can now see an ordered sequence of devices compromised in an
attack on the File Server. Furthermore, the results panel below lists an enumeration of the
vulnerabilities exploited to reach the target, illustrated in Figure 5.4. The results show that
the most probable attack vector leverages vulnerabilities in the Web Server, Workstation9
and the File Server, achieving a CVSS total vulnerability severity rating of 33.2.
Figure 5.4: A generated attack path, targetting the File Server of a small network.
Presented with this critical attack path, the administrator needs to make a decision as to
which devices to patch to prevent Bob from gaining root privileges to the File Server. One
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may ask “Why not patch all vulnerable software running on the devices in the network?”
The reason for dismissing this approach is that it may be financially infeasible to patch
every single device in a network. Consider a large enterprise network running thousands of
workstations which happens to all host a vulnerable version of a software product. To patch
all of these devices may cost the company a large sum of money, while the vulnerability
of these devices may play no critical role on the attack of high priority company assets.
With this in mind, NVA uses a technique called Critical Action Analysis, geared towards
highlighting the most crucial vulnerabilities, which when removed, eliminate all paths of
attack to a target. By performing Critical Action Analysis on this attack path, we see in
Figure 5.5 that the solution is to patch the Web Server, running Microsoft IIS 7.5 with
vulnerability CVE-2010-1256.
Figure 5.5: Results computing the most practical software to patch in order to prevent
a specific attack.
The administrator is able to simulate the patching process in NVA by right clicking the Web
Server and deselecting vulnerability CVE-2010-1256, shown in Figure 5.6. Now regenerating
the attack model, NVA is unable to produce any attack paths leading to the File Server,
demonstrating that the problem has been solved.
Figure 5.6: By deselecting a vulnerability from a network device it is no longer vulnerable
to it, therefore eliminating the threat it poses.
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Critical Action Analysis Computation
Dissecting the Critical Action Analysis process allows us to see why CVE-2010-1256 was
selected for patching over any of the other vulnerabilities in the discovered attack path of
critical actions. The algorithm aims to find the optimum exploit action to remove, such
that when removed it prevents any routes to the target state. Simply removing an exploit
action from the attack path identified does not guarantee prevention of the attack, since the
attacker may be able to reroute the attack, pivoting through other devices not necessarily in
the originally identified attack path, thus resulting in a new attack path. For this reason, the
algorithm tries to find a solution by systematically removing each vulnerability and analysing
the results. In this scenario we can visualize these results in Table 5.1:
Table 5.1 Each of the above vulnerabilities is sequentially removed from the network model
and the attack paths regenerated to determine a solution.
Vulnerability ID Resultant Attack Path Generated
CVE-2010-1256 ×
CVE-2008-0082 CVE-2010-1256(WEB SERVER) =⇒ CVE-2008-2551(WORKSTATION8)
=⇒ CVE-2005-4816(FILE SERVER) =⇒ CVE-2005-0113(FILE SERVER)
CVE-2005-4816 ×
CVE-2005-0113 ×
From Table 5.1 we notice that a set of 3 solutions have been identified; namely the removal
of CVE-2010-1256, CVE-2005-4816 and CVE-2005-0113. The removal of CVE-2008-0082
results in another attack path being generated, circumventing the usage of CVE-2008-0082
on WORKSTATION9. The existence of an alternate route means that this is not a valid
solution. The solution set is then arranged in order of their position in the attack path,
providing each solution with a ranking. In ranking solutions we can select a solution which
eliminates the threat as early as possible in the attack vector. The algorithm ranks the set
of solutions as follows:
1. CVE-2010-1256 (WEB SERVER)
2. CVE-2005-4816 (FILE SERVER)
3. CVE-2005-0113 (FILE SERVER)
By patching Microsoft IIS 7.5 on the Web Server, vulnerability CVE-2010-1256 is removed
from the network effectively eliminating Bob’s point of access into the network. With no
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means of further access into the network, Bob is no longer a threat to the network from an
external perspective (from the internet).
Network-Wide Security Scans
Another element which offers value to securing the network as a whole is the Network Scan
feature. Rather than the administrator individually selecting potential targets to test for
attack paths he can use the Network Scan feature to reveal critical attack paths to all
devices. This feature computes any possible attack path Bob may be able to use to get into
the network, allowing the administrator to further investigate any results of concern. After
running the Network Scan option, searching for vulnerabilities offering root privileges, we
see that several attack paths have been identified, illustrated in Figure 5.7.
Figure 5.7: A global scan on the network allows one to see all devices vulnerable to
attack and the attack paths involved.
Summary
In Case Study 1 we have shown how to identify potential targets of attacks using the Network
Scan feature as well as the discovery of critical attack paths for specifically targeted devices.
Furthermore, it was shown that solutions to these critical attack paths can be computed in
order to secure the school network in a practical manner.
5.1.2 Case Study 2
In the previous case we looked at a small school network environment and revealed potential
attack paths to critical systems. Case Study 2 focuses on a more realistic construct, show-
casing typical network infrastructure of large enterprise environments. A larger network is
a more challenging problem to solve since it adds to the complexity of identifying atomic
steps in an attack. This is due to an increase in potential connectivity relations between
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devices, more intricate topology structures and additionally, difficulty in determining crit-
ical paths due to an increase in the number of potential attack paths generated. Such a
scenario provides an opportunity to test the applicability of NVA to real-world problems,
since networks requiring a high degree of security are most likely to be larger organizations
with many devices.
Network Topology
A fictitious marketing firm, named Expand Media, is analysed in this case, looking to secure
their network from hackers after previously identified attempts. NVA was employed to
identify potential paths of attack, aimed at the compromise of mission critical services.
Similarly to Case Study 1, the devices this enterprise network contains include workstations,
servers, switches, routers and firewalls. Figure 5.8 illustrates the network’s topology, showing
the campus network design. This design is used for large networks since it affords high-
performance and improved reliability and manageability due to its scalability potential.
Furthermore, it allows a network to span across several buildings or departments with its
distributed multilayer architecture[55]. This suits Expand Media, considering that it contains
a number of different departments based on different floors of the building.
A router connects the internal network to the internet and uses a firewall, FW1, to moderate
ingress traffic from the internet. This acts as a first line of defence, filtering out any inbound
traffic attempting to access any services not intended to be exposed to the public. Services
exposed to the internet include the Exchange Server, Web Server and Proxy Server, housed
within the demilitarized zone(DMZ). These services are typical features within an enterprise
network and are kept separate from the intranet due to their exposure to the internet, for
safety measures. An external user only has access to devices within the DMZ, making them
an ideal target to attackers. Consequently, the Exchange Server, Web Server and Proxy
Server have been placed in their own DMZ subnetwork, managed by the DMZ Switch, in-
terfacing between the intranet and internet. A Core Switch acts as the central manager of
intranet data flow and is responsible for linking several subnets, allowing internal communi-
cation between all departments and mission critical services.
Floor 1 has its own switch which manages the Sales Department and Services subnets. The
Services Switch hosts internal services including the Database Server, File Server and Print
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Figure 5.8: Expand Media’s network topology, showing the layout of a typical enterprise
network.
Server, which are crucial to the operation of the marketing firm. These are deemed as high
value assets and are the focus of the firm’s security audit using NVA. The Database Server
stores information regarding the firm’s clientele, employee records, payrole data and user
credentials for management and departmental users. The nature of the content of this server
yields an asset value of 10, where asset values can be ranked between 1 and 10. The com-
promise of such sensitive data would be devastating to the functioning of Expand Media’s
business. The File Server is used to store everything related to clients’ products, ranging
from completed, archived and incomplete products. Furthermore, it is used a repository
for all the material required by employees to design and implement anything required for
projects. This server is also considered as high value and is assigned an asset value of 10,
since its compromise can lead to theft of property and subsequently a loss of revenue. The
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Print Server offers the ability to print documents to all of the departments. While this is a
commonly performed activity it is not deemed a mission critical function, since it is not an
absolute necessity in the daily functioning of business. Consequently, the asset value assigned
to it is much lower than that of the Database Server and File Server, ranked with a value of
3. It is important to note that access control lists (ACL) manage which devices have access
to these services. These lists, stored within switches, are set in accordance with company
policies, limiting which groups have access to certain networking resources. Departmental
access will be further elaborated on in the following paragraphs, describing the connectivity
with network resources as well as the implications there of.
The first floor plays host to Expand Media’s Sales Department, mediated by Floor 1 Switch
which controls a subnet of 10 workstations. These 10 workstation are dedicated to employees
working in the Sales Department only, and as such only have access to networking resources
required for sales-related tasks and projects. The ACL has been illustrated below in Table
5.2 to further describe visibility that devices within the Sales Department subnet have with
devices throughout the network. This information is of importance since it outlines potential
attack vectors a hacker can use by pivoting through exploited devices.
Table 5.2 A description of the ACL for the Sales Department.
Network Devices Workstation Connectivity
Proxy Server X
Web Server X
Exchange Server X
Database Server ×
File Server X
Print Server X
Floor 1 Subnet X
Floor 2 Subnet X
Floor 3 Subnet X
It is important to note from Table 5.2 that sales employees have access to mission critical
network services; namely the File Server. Projects and finished products are accessed from
and stored on the File Server, making this a fundamental network resource to the functioning
of Expand Media. The Database Server is not accessible by Sales Department employees
owing to the fact that they should not have access to any of its content.
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The second floor is managed by the Floor 2 Switch and regulates communication between
the Human Resources subnet and the rest of the internal network. The Human Resources
departments is comprised of 10 workstations designated to Human Resources employees only.
Table 5.3 depicts the connectivity relations workstations within this subnet have within
Expand Media’s network.
Table 5.3 A description of the ACL for the Human Resources Department.
Network Devices Workstation Connectivity
Proxy Server X
Web Server X
Exchange Server X
Database Server ×
File Server ×
Print Server X
Floor 1 Subnet X
Floor 2 Subnet X
Floor 3 Subnet X
The ACL restricts these employees from accessing key mission critical resources such as
the Database Server or File Server on account of this department storing printed copies of
records. This reduces the probability of workstations within this subnet being targeted since
they offer no direct route to primary targets; notably the Database or File Servers. However,
attacks on this subnet should not be ruled out considering that they do have connectivity
to other departmental subnets and the publicly exposed DMZ.
The Financial Department is on the third floor and is managed by the Floor 3 Switch. Floor
3 Switch controls a subnet of 10 workstations whose usages revolve around all activities
expected of the Financial Department. Employees in this department cover a wide range of
bookkeeping activities including, day to day transactional accounting, management of the
organization’s cashflow, budget management, sales and expenditure forecasts, and reporting
back to management to assist in making key strategic decisions. The Financial Department
play an indispensable role in any enterprise, providing essential information used to maximize
profits. Table 5.4 illustrates the connectivity that workstations in this subnet have within
the network.
The ACL has some interesting differences when compared with those of the Sales Department
and Human Resources Department. Financial Department users have access to sensitive
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Table 5.4 A description of the ACL for the Financial Department.
Network Devices Workstation Connectivity
Proxy Server ×
Web Server ×
Exchange Server ×
Database Server X
File Server X
Print Server X
Floor 1 Subnet X
Floor 2 Subnet X
Floor 3 Subnet X
financial information stored within the Database Server, which should not be made available
to any other users for security reasons. In an effort to enhance security in this department,
workstations do not have access to any publicly exposed devices, such as the Proxy Server,
Web Server or Exchange Server. The aim of this is to avoid the threat of a direct attack on
this high priority subnet from a compromised DMZ service.
Network Device Configuration Information
In this section we elaborate on vulnerable products identified on devices within the network.
Enumeration of this information is a necessity while auditing the overall security of any net-
work, since it provides insight into potential weaknesses which can be exploited. A detailed
overview of this information is provided in Appendix B, highlighting the most important el-
ements of each vulnerability. This information is used in constructing a more comprehensive
security assessment of Expand Media’s network by constructing attack graphs.
Scenario Description
Expand Media worked its way up from humble beginnings to become a leader in the adver-
tising world. Having established themselves as a dominant force in their field, their success
has lead them to expand into a large enterprise. Steeped in fierce competition, Expand
Media has developed a number of rivals in the battle for high-end customers. In recent
events, Expand Media managed to capture some key clientele, creating a stir amongst their
competition. Rival company Apex Marketing, aiming to win some clients of Expand Media,
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hired a hacker to break into their network and steal the customer database and any intellec-
tual property of interest. Initial attempts at this raised the alarms, prompting the network
administrator to look into better securing the network.
The network administrator realised that patching every vulnerable software device in the
enterprise network would be costly and impractical. Moreover, the downtime involved in
patching every server and workstation would be costly for Expand Media since it interfere
with users’ work flow. NVA was employed to identify key points of interest, which when
secured could help to eliminate threats posed against high value organizational assets. The
compromise of the customer database would be devastating to Expand Media and will likely
lead to large losses in terms of clientele and revenue. Consequently, the overall security of
the network is also crucial in protecting the company’s financial status.
NVA Usage Walkthrough
An assumption was made for this case that the attacker was targeting the network from
the internet. In terms of the network configuration this suggested that initially the attacker
would only have access to publicly exposed devices; namely the DMZ. Network fingerprinting
would reveal to the attacker the 3 services contained within the DMZ. Using NMAP, the
attacker can scan Expand Media’s website to retrieve its public IP address. Once this IP
is obtained further probing can be performed by consulting the WHOIS service. WHOIS
is a protocol used for querying online databases of registered domain names and internet
resources[56]. A WHOIS query can provide information to the attacker in a human readable
format on other domains registered to Expand Media, such as he Proxy Server and Exchange
Server.
An automated preliminary vulnerability scan performed by NVA on individual devices pro-
duced the following useful information:
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Network Vulnerability Analyser Results
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Network contains 45 devices, including:
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PCs: 31
Servers: 6
Switches: 6
Routers: 1
Network contains 10 vulnerabilities.
As mentioned previously, the focus of this audit was to help secure mission critical resources;
namely the Database Server and File Server. The Database Server was marked as the first
target for attack, in an attempt to gain root privileges. Hitting the Generate Graph button
in NVA revealed that the Database Server was reachable with a multi-step attack. Figure
5.9 shows several devices highlighted in red, which were pivoted through in this attack to
reach the final target.
Figure 5.9: Scan results of the Database Server reveal that it is not safe from attackers
based on external networks.
These results are concerning since they demonstrate that the Database Server is not safe
from externally based attackers. Looking at the Attack Graph tab shows the critical attack
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path generated by the planner. It illustrates the sequence of devices compromised in this
attack, including both publicly exposed devices as well as devices which should only be
accessible within the local area network. Figure 5.10 illustrates the critical attack path
below.
Figure 5.10: The Database Server is vulnerable to attack and can be reached by pivoting
through a number of network devices.
Analysing results produced by the planner reveals several interesting metrics about the
generated critical attack path. These results are shown below:
Target node: Database_Server
Admin Access gained using sequence: CVE-2008-0075(WEB_SERVER)
=> CVE-2004-0409(WORKSTATION10) => CVE-2004-0409(WORKSTATION30)
=> CVE-2004-1351(DATABASE_SERVER)
Compuation time: 0.04s
Total vulnerability severity rating: 35.0
The aforementioned attack sequence shows both the devices compromised as well as the
vulnerabilities which would have been exploited in the process. Walking through this se-
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quence it was discovered that the attacker’s point of entry was the Web Server, exploiting a
vulnerability in the Microsoft IIS 6.0 software. This vulnerability can be executed remotely
and grants root privileges to the attacker. With a compromised device which acts as an
interface between the internet and internal network the attacker could then gain visibility
of the internal network by performing broadcast scans to detect live hosts. According to
Table 5.2, Table 5.3 and Table 5.4 the attacker would only have access to workstation within
the Sales Department and Human Resources Department. While the compromise of de-
vices within these subnets would not provide direct access to the Services subnet, they do
present an opportunity to further explore the internal network for other possibilities. The
next victim was Workstation10, compromised via a vulnerability in a chat application the
user was running. A port scan of Workstation10, from the compromised Web Server, would
reveal to the attacker an open port associated with XChat 1.8.0. The exploit offers user
privileges to the device, which is sufficient for him to continue further penetration into the
network. This also outlines the importance of restricting the kinds of applications allowed
to be run on workstations or eliminating the ability to install any applications. An employee
who is able to install software on workstations may inadvertently be creating an opportu-
nity for an attacker to gain entrance to the corporate network. The attacker discovers that
the user working on Workstation10 was in fact chatting to another user in the Financial
Department’s subnet, on Workstation30. Executing the same exploit against Workstation30
gained the attacker user level privileges, but more importantly visibility of the main target,
since workstations in this subnet are able to connect to the Database Server. By pivoting
to Workstation30 the attacker would have the Database Server in his cross-hair, with direct
accessibility. Performing an NMAP scan on the Database Server exposed useful informa-
tion to the attacker. An outdated operating system, Solaris 8, with known security holes
provided the foundation for the Database Server. These favourable circumstances allowed
the Database Server to be exploited via a vulnerability in the rwho daemon. Successfully
executing this exploit presented the attacker with root access to the final target and a means
to steal sensitive client information for Apex Marketing.
A second audit was also performed on the File Server to identify whether there was any
threat of it being compromised. This server is of interest to the attacker, considering that
the intellectual property stored on it could be useful to a rival organization if obtained.
Marking the File Server as a target and attempting to gain root privileges revealed similar
feedback to the previous target. The output below provides some insight into the most likely
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attack path an attacker would use to compromise the target.
Target node: File_Server
Admin Access gained using sequence: CVE-2008-0075(WEB_SERVER)
=> CVE-2004-0409(WORKSTATION10) => CVE-2004-1351(FILE_SERVER)
Compuation time: 0.04s
Total vulnerability severity rating: 27.5
The pattern of the attack above is quite similar to that of the Database Server, with an
identical point of entry through the Web Server, leading to the compromise of Workstation10.
However, the attack path differs from that point onwards, requiring one attack step less to
reach the final target. If we look at Table 5.2 we notice that Workstation10 in the Sales
Department does in fact have direct access to the File Server. The File Server, running the
same vulnerable version of Solaris 8 as an operating system, was exploited after pivoting
through Workstation10, providing the attacker with root privileges and access to sensitive
files.
Critical Action Analysis Computation
In order to rectify the security issues identified above it is important to patch vulnerable
software on devices which acted as conduits for an attacker to reach his targets. Critical
Action Analysis points the administrator to this solution by computing points in the critical
attack path, which when eliminated completely prevent the attacker from reaching his goal.
Performing this calculation on the critical attack path identified for the Database Server
produced the following result:
Critical Action Analysis:
----------------------------------------------
Identified 1 solution(s):
xchat xchat 1_8_0 with vulnerability CVE-2004-0409 on WORKSTATION10
In essence, by eliminating vulnerability CVE-2004-0409 on Workstation10, by either patch-
ing the software or uninstalling it completely, prevents the compromise of the Database
Server. Asset Action Analysis was also performed on the critical attack path, which is based
on the same algorithm as Critical Action Analysis, but sorts potential solutions from the
highest asset value to the lowest. Results of Asset Action Analysis provided the following
information:
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Asset Action Analysis:
----------------------------------------------
Identified 1 solution(s):
sun solaris 8_0 with vulnerability CVE-2004-1351 on DATABASE_SERVER
Here we see that the solution selected was vulnerability CVE-2004-1351 on the Database
Server, as opposed to CVE-2004-0409 on Workstation10. While both of these solutions
prevent the attacker entirely from reaching the target, the Database Server’s vulnerability is
selected in Asset Action Analysis since the device’s value is 10 while Workstation10’s is only
1. In this case study the Asset Action Analysis is of more interest in producing a solution
since the compromise of a high valued asset can have a very large impact on the company. In
an enterprise network environment where hundreds or thousands of devices may be reliant
on the availability of certain services it is more beneficial to prioritise the patching of higher
valued assets.
Summary
In Case Study 2 we looked at the applicability of NVA to much larger networks such as
those present in enterprises. A campus network topology was analysed, typical in enterprise
networks, which added made the discovery of critical attack paths more challenging due to
an increase in potential actions at each step of attack. NVA proved that it was fully capable
of identifying critical attack paths in a network containing 45 network devices and could
correctly compute solutions to prevent identified attack vectors.
5.2 Performance and Scalability of NVA Framework
In Case Study 1 the Network Scan feature was introduced for computing network-wide scans
of all existing critical attack paths. From a single point of entry, it tries to determine whether
each device in the network is reachable by an attacker. While this feature adds benefit in
terms of identifying potential threats which may not have been previously discovered, it
can become computationally expensive as the network grows in size and complexity. The
practicality of the Network Scan feature is analysed in this section to determine whether it
may be of use in scenarios with large networks. An issue which was acknowledged is that the
amount of time taken for a Network Scan to complete should be within reasonable bounds
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to make this feature useful. Previous techniques which used exhaustive searches to generate
complete attack graphs would become impractical due to the computation time required to
analyse larger networks. The aim of this section was to see whether a planner can be applied
to this problem to perform partially exhaustive searches by guiding attacks on each device
using heuristics.
Evaluation methods used involved analysing the time taken to scan randomly generating
networks of increasing size. Network generation was done using the network generator which
was built into NVA. A basic campus network design was used for each network, where
workstations or servers form clusters, connected to switches and routers. Vulnerable software
were selected at random from NVD and assigned to randomly selected hosts, thus adding to
the complexity by making not every host exploitable. In Figure 5.11 networks of increasing
size are depicted with the amount of time taken to compute a Network Scan. Scans were
focused on finding critical attack paths that resulted in the attacker gaining root privileges
only. Tests were performed on a laptop with Intel Core2 Duo CPU T6670 @ 2.20GHz x 2
and 2.8GB memory, running 32 bit Ubuntu Linux.
Figure 5.11: The total time taken to perform a Network Scan is the summation of the
computation of every critical attack path for a network’s devices.
From Figure 5.11 we can see a significant rise in the amount of time taken to compute criti-
cal attack paths as the network size increases. This is mainly due to the drastic increase in
complexity caused by increasing the size. Essentially, the size increase translates into more
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planner actions during the evaluation of each attack step. This is due to the fact that a
larger network presents the attacker with more possibilities in terms of device connections
and vulnerabilities to exploit. In larger networks the primary function of NVA is to assess
the risk of attack posed against selected devices, by identifying high priority assets which
are likely targets. However, as shown in Figure 5.11 it is still possible to do network wide
scans of medium size networks in a reasonable amount of time.
NVA was intended to be used to plan attacks against realistically sized networks, encouraging
the analysis of NVA performance on medium to large networks. In order to simplify the
generation of networks certain adjustments were made to the initial algorithm to speed up
the process. Typically, network generation selects vulnerable software from NVD at random
and randomly assigns them to PCs or servers. Vulnerability selection was restricted by
creating a pool of 20 different vulnerable software, from NVD, for selection and assignment
to devices. In large enterprise networks workstations usually have a uniform set of software
installed on them, differing only between departments where users may require different
types of software. This restricted range of software installations means that there may be
a large amount of vulnerable devices present in a network with the same vulnerability sets.
This rationale suggested the restriction of the vulnerability database to a small pool of
products while generating large scale networks. The results of several large networks tested
are displayed in Table 5.5 below.
Table 5.5 Network wide scans performed on large scale networks.
Network Size Computation Time
300 Devices 3m 4s
500 Devices 13m 2s
1000 Devices 1h 33m 55s
The implications of reducing the pool of selectable vulnerable software for the generated
network resulted in a reduced amount of operators in the planning domain. This directly
affects memory consumption since much fewer exploit actions are required to be performed
at each attack step during the plan construction phase. Table 5.5 demonstrates the Network
Scan feature can be used successfully on large enterprise networks within a reasonable amount
of time if the number of different exploit actions is limited to a smaller range.
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5.3 Assessment of Research Objectives
We set out to determine whether this research could address a number issues which have
greatly limited attack graph application to real world scenarios. While previous approaches
were promising, they focused mainly on implementing proof of concept prototypes which
could evaluate the security of small-scale networks. Challenges in computing attack graphs
are listed below.
• Exhaustive enumeration of each possible state of attack leads to state-space explosion,
due to the exponential nature of the problem. This means that it is impractical to
build attack graphs of large and intricate networks.
• Generation of complete attack graphs are difficult to visualise since even the smallest
networks can produce massive graphs, which quickly expand latitudinally.
• Exploit actions need to be strictly defined in terms of preconditions and postcondi-
tions. Currently, no publicly available databases exist which specify exploits in this
standardised format.
C. Sarraute et al.[18] have proposed the closest related work, which integrates an automated
planner into the Core Impact penetration testing framework.1 They extract the description
of attack exploit actions, in terms of requirements and results, from the Core Impact’s ex-
tensive exploit database.
Having now done an evaluation on two scenarios, as well as testing NVA’s performance and
scalability potential, we can now report on its effectiveness at tackling the aforementioned
research objectives. Each of the research objectives stated in Table 5.6 were achieved, illus-
trating NVA’s benefit in identifying points of weakness in medium and large networks. The
prototype was successful in discovering the expected attack vectors for targeted devices in
both case studies, and could present optimal solutions which eliminated the threats.
1http://www.coresecurity.com/core-impact-pro
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5.4 Chapter Summary
In this chapter we demonstrated the applicability of NVA to both small networks and large
scale enterprise networks. In Case Study 1 it was shown that critical attack paths could
be generated for a simple network featuring only 13 hosts. Moreover, NVA was shown to
produce the most beneficial solution to protect the targeted assets from an attacker. In Case
Study 2 a much larger enterprise network was audited by NVA, to reveal critical paths which
would lead to the compromise of high value hosts. Both Critical Action Analysis and Asset
Action Analysis were used to produce a solution to these threats, outlining the importance
of prioritising asset values in these solutions for such a scenario. In the Performance and
Scalability section we looked at how well the Network Scan feature could scale up for larger
networks. It was shown that while this feature is more useful for smaller networks, it can
scale up for large enterprise networks of 1000 hosts in a reasonable amount of time.
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Table 5.6 An analysis measuring how effectively the research objectives were satisfied.
Research Objective Result
Attack Type Identification NVA sources exploit information from the publicly available vul-
nerability database NVD, which presents vulnerabilities using
the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS). Analysis
of the type of data and structure of entries in vulnerability
databases revealed that planners can currently best model ex-
ploits which result in the elevation of an attacker’s privileges on
a machine. Denial of service attacks can be modelled by simply
switching off the availability of a service, after the compromise of
its host. However, at this point in time, vulnerability databases
do not supply a machine-readable field which can specify whether
an attack results in privilege escalation, denial of service or infor-
mation disclosure. For this reason, NVA focused on vulnerabili-
ties which result in the escalation of privileges, since they clearly
define the preconditions and postconditions of their exploitation.
Critical Path Enumeration By incorporating and automated planner (SGPlan5) into NVA,
attacks are searched for with a heuristic, without constructing
complete attack graphs, thus solving the state-space explosion
issue. SGPlan5 consistently identifies the optimum critical path
of attack by using a heuristic function that optimizes the ag-
gregated CVSS severity score of attack paths. A by-product of
critical attack path computation is the solution to the visualiza-
tion issue which plagued previous attack graph approaches. The
linear nature of a critical attack path simplifies the visualiza-
tion of attacks and also makes it easier for users to comprehend
threats.
Network Strengthening Analysis Two analysis techniques were developed to aid in strengthen-
ing networks in which critical attack paths are identified. The
graph analysis algorithms successfully compute solutions which
prevent an attack from occurring, each based on differing prior-
ities. The first algorithm eliminates an attack threat by causing
the maximum disconnection in a critical attack path, by remov-
ing a single node to prevent an attack from further progressing
to its target. Similarly, the second algorithm produces the max-
imum disconnection in a critical attack path, while prioritising
the protection of machines with high asset values.
Performance and Scalability SGPlan5 consistently computed the expected critical attack
paths for each test case within reasonable time frames. Test
cases with networks up to 1000 hosts were computed by SGPlan5
without the framework crashing or becoming non-responsive.
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Conclusion
This chapter starts off by briefly summarizing some of the key topics covered in the pre-
ceding chapters. It also compares the results discovered with initially proposed objectives,
to determine the degree of success of this thesis. Lastly, it provides perspective on potential
propositions for future work.
6.1 Summary
Overwhelming amounts of network information make it very difficult for security adminis-
trators to manually determine weaknesses in IT infrastructure as a whole. Attack graphs
use network configuration information, including topological data and device information, as
well as vulnerability information to derive an overview of potential multi-step attacks. Many
large-scale enterprise networks are monitored by Security Information and Event Manage-
ment (SIEM) systems, which aggregate and correlate event data to alert security adminis-
trators of possible attacks in progress. These systems have detailed knowledge about the
infrastructure being monitored and can be enhanced with an automated attack modelling
tool. The amalgamation of these two technologies benefit security administrators during
risk assessment phases, which typically should be conducted whenever a network is updated.
This thesis researched the issue with current attack graphing approaches and found that
they are severely limited in their abilities due to a combinatorial problem, whereby an ex-
haustive search of every possible attack is not feasible for medium- to large-scale networks.
This thesis has identified four objectives for its work. They were:
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• Identification of the kind of attacks that can be modelled using an attack planning
approach.
• Implementation of a proof of concept prototype to determine whether attack paths can
in fact be enumerated for selected network devices.
• Investigation into analysis techniques which can best be combined with automated
planning to strengthen points of weakness in networks.
• Measurement of scalability and performance of the prototype against networks of in-
creasing size and complexity.
Previous attack graphing approaches have not been successful in providing an implemen-
tation which is practical to real-world application. Proof of concept implementations were
applied to small networks and only modelled small sets of exploits. These techniques built
complete attack graphs, exhaustively searching for every possible attack path. Analysis of
these approaches has shown that they have exponential complexity, suffering severely from
the state-space explosion problem, also known as the combinatorial problem. Another issue
plaguing previous approaches is the lack of up-to-date and complete exploit information for
vulnerable software products. To tackle the complexity issue, investigation was done into
a field of Artificial Intelligence known as Automated Planning. It concerns itself with a
deliberation process of action sequences by measuring their expected outcomes. This delib-
eration process aims to find an optimal solution path to a goal by guiding a search through
a state-space with a heuristic, rather than building a complete graph.
A design was presented, which incorporated automated planning with publicly available
vulnerability information from NVD into a proof of concept framework named Network
Vulnerability Analyser (NVA). Using a network configuration information model, NVA can
cross-examine installed software products with a vulnerability database to determine what
kind of vulnerabilities exist. Vulnerabilities present in a network are transcoded from their
NVD database entries into exploit action models, based on vulnerability preconditions and
postconditions. Both the set of exploit action models and network model are converted into
PDDL, a standardised automated planner language. Further research was conducted to de-
cide which automated planner would be most suited to computing network security plans.
Results from The Fifth International Planning Competition (IPC-5), an automated plan-
ner benchmarking competition, concluded that SGPlan5 is most suitable due to its overall
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consistency and ability to manage both complex and simple problems. Upon further con-
sideration, it was decided that a resultant critical attack path from the planner was not
sufficient information for a security administrator to use as a solution. Two analysis al-
gorithms were developed to aid the user in making informed decisions as to which devices
needed to be patched to ultimately prevent the attack from occurring. The first algorithm
was designed to single out a device, which when patched, eliminates the threat and also
minimizes the impact of an attack on the network. On the other hand, the second algorithm
was designed to identify a device to patch based on the asset values of devices in the network.
NVA was designed to accept network configuration information in XML documents. The
decision behind this was to support information input from other systems, such as SIEMs,
where network configuration information is readily available.
Evaluation of NVA was broken down into two main sections: case study demonstrations
and scalability analysis. Two case studies were experimented with, each of which aimed to
highlight different functions offered by NVA. In the first case study a small scale network is
considered, with a simple topological layout. The network was divided up into three different
subnets, two of play host to workstations, while the other houses a set of servers. Servers
running in the third subnet include a web server, file server and database server. Tests
against the file server demonstrated that NVA was able to discover a critical attack path
which lead to its compromise. Furthermore, a solution to the attack was identified using
critical action analysis. It showed that patching a vulnerability in the web server would not
only prevent the file server from being compromised, but also prevent an external attacker
from gaining any access to the internal network at all. The second case study examined a
large scale network which was a lot more complex in nature. This network simulated the
structure of an enterprise network, constituted of a hierarchical structure of routers and
switches to emulate a campus network topology. A DMZ subnetwork, interfacing with both
the internet and internal network, comprised of an exchange server, web server and proxy
server. The internal network was divided into three subnetworks of workstations, each of
which were used by different organizational departments. Moreover, a services subnetwork
on the internal network hosted a database server, file server and print server. In this network
the connectivity relationships between devices was restricted by firewall ingress and egress
rules, which add to the complexity of computing critical attack paths. NVA proved that
it was fully capable of identifying critical attack paths in a network containing 45 network
devices and could correctly compute solutions to prevent identified attack vectors. It also
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demonstrated how a solution could be identified by prioritizing the asset values of devices in
the network. NVA was intended to be used to plan attacks against realisticly sized networks,
which encouraged the testing of its performance on networks of increasingly large scale. Scal-
ability tests were conducted which aimed to identify critical attack paths for every host in a
network. Results showed that it can scale up for large enterprise networks of 1000 hosts in
a reasonable amount of time.
In regard to the proposed research objectives, this thesis has succeeded in what it aimed to
achieve. The results of the prototype showed the following:
• Analysis of the type of data and structure of entries in vulnerability databases revealed
that planners can currently best model exploits which result in the elevation of an at-
tacker’s privileges on a machine. Denial of service attacks can be modelled by simply
switching off the availability of a service, after the compromise of its host. However, at
this point in time, vulnerability databases do not supply a machine-readable field which
can specify whether an attack results in privilege escalation, denial of service or infor-
mation disclosure. For this reason, NVA focused on vulnerabilities which result in the
escalation of privileges, since they clearly define the preconditions and postconditions
of their exploitation.
• Evaluation of case studies illustrated how NVA can enumerate critical attack paths,
using an automated planner (SGPlan5) to guide the state-space search with a heuristic
function. The heuristic function guided searches by discovering paths which yield the
maximum aggregated CVSS severity score of attacks.
• Two analysis techniques were developed to aid in strengthening networks in which crit-
ical attack paths are identified. The graph analysis algorithms successfully compute
solutions which prevent an attack from occurring, each based on differing priorities.
The first algorithm eliminates an attack threat by causing the maximum disconnection
in a critical attack path, by removing a single node to prevent an attack from further
progressing to its target. Similarly, the second algorithm produces the maximum dis-
connection in a critical attack path, while prioritizing the protection of machines with
high asset values.
• SGPlan5 consistently computed the expected critical attack paths for each test case
within reasonable time frames. Test cases with networks up to 1000 hosts were com-
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puted by SGPlan5 without the framework crashing or becoming non-responsive.
SIEM can enhance the effectiveness of NVA since it aggregates extensive knowledge about
the network it monitors. It is highly suitable as a knowledge source for the topological
structure of networks, connectivity relations between devices, as well as host configuration
information such as software products installed. The highly integrated nature of tools incor-
porated into SIEM, which manage things such as network discovery and device configuration
information aggregation, can streamline NVA’s security analysis by providing it with network
information.
6.2 Future Research
Contributions made by this thesis concentrated on expressing the potential that automated
planning can bring to the attack modelling field. Shortcomings of this thesis stem mainly
from the lack of availability of exploit information. Currently, no publicly available databases
exist which express exploits in terms of their requirements for successful execution, and
resultant outcomes. Details which describe the difficulty of execution, the average execution
time, the type of exploit, code availability and effects it has on a network, would be highly
beneficial for attack modelling. It would allow attack probabilities to be factored in, which
in combination with exploit severity ratings, could optimize attack path computation even
further. While the construction of such a database would have its challenges, further research
into such endeavours may prove fruitful. Moreover, it is envisioned that a set of software
Application Programming Interfaces (API) be developed to better interface with SIEMs and
network discovery tools. Integration of these APIs into NVA would simplify the network
configuration input process. Additionally, it could aide in providing alerts and security
reports back to a SIEM’s main dashboard. Another consideration for future work, looks at
the introduction of Common Configuration Enumerations (CCE)1 into the framework. The
CCE database enumerates weaknesses in system and software configurations. Consequently,
this would also require the input of richer device information which provides configurations
for installed products.
1http://nvd.nist.gov/cce/index.cfm
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Appendix A
Case Study 1 Network Product
Installations
Cross-referencing the products installed on hosts in Case Study 1 with NVD produced a
number of vulnerabilities, which could be leveraged by an attacker. These results are re-
flected in Appendix A, listing vulnerability information sourced from NVD entries with the
corresponding CVE identifier. Most importantly, these entries denote the CVSS severity
of a successfully exploited vulnerability, the type of access required to the targeted host,
and the resultant privilege level gained from exploitation. This information is important for
generation of critical attack paths, as well as the computation of solutions to these paths.
Device Installed
Product
CVE ID Access
Vector
Privilege
Gained
CVSS Vulnerability Description
Web Server Microsoft IIS
7.5
CVE-
2010-1256
NetworkAdmin 8.5 Unspecified vulnerability in Microsoft IIS
7.5, when Extended Protection for Authen-
tication is enabled, allows remote authenti-
cated users to execute arbitrary code via un-
known vectors related to ”token checking.”
File Server ProFTPD
1.2.pre1
CVE-
2005-4816
NetworkUser 7.5 Buffer overflow in mod radius in ProFTPD
before 1.3.0rc2 allows remote attackers to
cause a denial of service (crash) and possibly
execute arbitrary code via a long password.
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SGI Irix 6.5 CVE-
2005-0113
Local Admin 7.2 inpview in SGI IRIX allows local users to
execute arbitrary commands via the SUN
TTSESSION CMD environment variable,
which is executed by inpview without drop-
ping privileges.
Workstation3Free Down-
load Manager
2.5
CVE-
2009-0184
NetworkAdmin 9.3 Multiple buffer overflows in the torrent pars-
ing implementation in Free Download Man-
ager (FDM) 2.5 allow remote attackers to
execute arbitrary code via a long file name
within a torrent file or a long tracker URL in
a torrent file.
Workstation8Icona Instant
Messenger
1.0.0.1
CVE-
2008-2551
NetworkAdmin 9.3 The DownloaderActiveX Control in Icona
SpA C6 Messenger 1.0.0.1 allows remote at-
tackers to force the download and execution
of arbitrary files via a URL.
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Appendix B
Visualization of Networks on the
NVA GUI
The network in Case Study 1 was plotted in NVA, illustrating the network’s topological
layout, device properties and connectivity relations between devices. NVA provides the tools
to determine an attacker’s most likely path of attack, highlighting the weakest points in a
network’s security. Analysis of attack vectors support users in making decisions regarding
the most practical ways to address threats.
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